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Essays on Market Microstructure
Yaarit Even
In this doctoral dissertation, I study markets in which the private information held
by various agents may be reflected in prices, and as a result may be leaked to other
market participants. Specifically, I study how the market microstructure interacts
with the price discovery process, the market efficiency, agents’ market power, and
social welfare. This dissertation consists of two chapters.
The first chapter studies the implications of leakage of information through prices
for the efficient operation of markets with heterogeneous agents. Focusing on uniform-
price double auctions, I first characterize how the presence of heterogeneity (e.g., in
terms of agents’ trading costs, information precision, or risk attitudes) can shape the
information content of prices and hence the market’s informational efficiency. I find
that price informativeness decreases with the extent of heterogeneity in the market.
I then establish that such reductions in price informativeness can in turn manifest
themselves as an informational externality: in the presence of heterogeneity, agents
do not internalize the impact of their trading decisions on the information revealed
to others via prices. This chapter also shows that the welfare implications of this
heterogeneity-induced informational externality depends on the intricate details of the
market. The results thus indicate that accounting for the possibility of information
leakage should be an important consideration in designing markets with asymmetric
information. I conclude by exploring the welfare implications of market segmentation
in the presence of heterogeneous agents and information leakage.
The second chapter studies how information asymmetry shapes price impact in
the presence of strategic interactions, i.e., agents’ actions being strategic substitutes
or strategic complements. Focusing on demand-function competition with strategic
interactions, I first establish the existence and characterize the equilibrium. The char-
acterization indicates that strategic interactions have a direct impact on the weights
agents put on their private information: as strategic interaction increases, agents
put less weight on their private information. I also characterize the relation between
price impact, strategic interaction, and information asymmetry. While price im-
pact decreases as the level of information asymmetry decreases, the relation between
price impact and strategic interaction is more subtle, and it depends on whether
agents submit upward- or downward-sloping demand schedules. When agents submit
downward-sloping demand curves, price impact decreases as the extent of strategic
substitutability increases, and increases as the extent of strategic complementarity
increases. Furthermore, strong interaction may mitigate or exacerbate the effect of
information asymmetry on agents’ price impact, depending on the slope of the inverse
supply curve. The results in this chapter thus emphasize the importance of account-
ing for strategic interactions between market participants, when assessing their price
impact in markets with asymmetric information.
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Introduction
“Fundamentally, in a system in which the knowledge of the relevant facts
is dispersed among many people, prices can act to coördinate the separate
actions of different people.”
— Friedrich A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society (1945)
The availability and distribution of information in a market has an important role
in shaping the market’s operations and welfare. As a result, a growing literature
has focused on the role information plays in various financial and economic settings.
It is often the case that information is dispersed throughout the market. That is,
many market participants hold different pieces of private information regarding the
goods that are being traded. In financial markets, for example, traders have private
information regarding the value of various financial assets. An important question
thus emerges on whether and how markets aggregate information in a world where
information is dispersed.
It is by now conventional wisdom that prices convey important information to
market participants. The seminal idea on the role of prices in aggregating and effi-
ciently transmitting information is due to Hayek [32]. The Vice Chair for Supervision
of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System observes in his speech at [18],
that “Hayek emphasized that the signals transmitted by the various individual prices
in the economy could, together, serve as a useful means of guiding overall resource
allocation. The reason is that prices convey messages to consumers and producers
even when the information that drives prices is not aggregated or directly observed.”
According to this perspective, prices allow market participants to take advantage of
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the information that would not have otherwise been available to them. Prices, there-
fore, serve a dual role as an index of scarcity and conveyor of information, or in other
words, they clear the market and aggregate information.
If one is to take the Hayekian perspective seriously, then the information aggrega-
tion process should be an important parameter for design and regulation of markets.
Indeed, in its policy report on the emergence of “dark pools” for equity trading, the
International Organization of Securities Commissions [36] argued that “[...] where reg-
ulators consider permitting different market structures [...] they should consider the
impact of doing so on price discovery [...].” Another prominent example is the class
of emissions permits markets in the various “cap-and-trade” systems implemented
around the globe. In brief, a cap is set on total amount of permitted pollution,
while emission allowances within the cap are distributed to (potential) emitters. The
allowances can then be exchanged on a secondary market. One of the key design ob-
jectives of such a scheme is for the price in the secondary market to reflect the social
costs of emissions, thus inducing firms to internalize the impact of their production
decisions. An inefficient price discovery process can lead to suboptimal budgeting
decisions for firms and inefficient reduction of emissions (e.g., see [21]).
Designing markets that take into account the value of information and its interac-
tion with other factors in the market requires the analysis and the understanding of
the market operations and the underlying forces that impact the market outcomes.
The aims of this dissertation is to take a step towards understanding the impact of
the market microstructure on the information aggregation process by prices and on
the overall performance of the market.
Chapter 1 of this dissertation studies how the extent to which the price reveals
information can shape the informational and allocative efficiency of the market. Fur-
thermore, it explores how the way and extent the information is revealed depends
on the characteristics of market participants and on the market structure. By in-
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formational efficiency, we mean that prices are able to fully aggregate all dispersed
information. In other words, a trader observing the price and her private information
is able to trade, as if she knew all the available information in the market. Allocative
efficiency, on the other hand, refers to an efficient allocation of resources. In a finan-
cial market setting, for example, this means that the quantity of the asset traded by
each trader coincides with the socially optimal value.
Specifically, we study how heterogeneity in the market (e.g., in terms of agents’
trading costs, information precision, valuations, and risk attitudes) may interact
with the market price’s role as an endogenous source of information. We consider a
uniform-price double auction consisting of an arbitrary number of agents trading a
single good with interdependent valuations. Importantly, each agent has access to
some private information about the good’s underlying value. For example, in the
context of the example mentioned above, these agents may correspond to various
carbon-producing firms trading emissions permits, who may be privately informed
about their abatement costs.
We start by investigating the market’s informational efficiency, defined as the
extent to which prices are able to aggregate the information dispersed throughout
the market. In this sense, a market is informationally efficient if the price serves as a
sufficient statistic for all the information dispersed throughout the market.
Our first set of results establish that the market’s informational efficiency is highly
sensitive to the characteristics of market participants. In particular, we find that the
market is less informationally efficient the more heterogeneous the agents are. This
is a consequence of the fact that agents’ characteristics determine the intensity of
their market activity and hence the extent to which their private information will
be reflected in the price. This result thus indicates that the extent of information
leakage can vary with the intricate details of the market structure.
As our second set of results, we find that this informational inefficiency also trans-
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lates into an informational externality: in a heterogeneous market, agents do not
internalize how their actions shape the information content of prices and hence the
information available to other agents. This finding indicates that the characteristics
of market participants, and as a result, the extent to which the price reveals informa-
tion, may severely undermine the workings of the market. Interestingly, we find that
the direction of this informational externality depends on whether the informational
or the allocative role of prices dominate. When the informational role dominates —
i.e., when the main role of the price is as an endogenous public signal in the market
— agents with relatively high trading costs under-react to their private information,
whereas agents with relatively low trading costs over-react, resulting in an equilib-
rium price that is not informative enough. In contrast, when the main role of the
price is as an index of scarcity — i.e., to match supply and demand — agents with
high trading costs over-react to their private information, and agents with low trad-
ing costs under-react, resulting in an equilibrium price that is too informative. In
particular, whether an agent is over-reacting or under-reacting depends on (i) how
her private signal covaries with the asset’s payoff estimation error of other traders;
and (ii) the slope of agents’ demand curves. The covariance in (i) captures whether
other agents are over-estimating or under-estimating the true underlying value of the
good. Then, the slope of their demand curves determine how they react to a change
in the price resulting from the agent’s action.
Finally, to assess the policy implications of the mechanisms identified in this
work, we investigate how changes in the market architecture can impact the market’s
informational and allocative efficiencies. Importantly, we find that policies that shape
the distribution of agents that participate in the market can have a first-order effect
on the efficient operations of the market.
Chapter 2 of this dissertation studies how information asymmetry shapes price
impact in the presence of strategic interactions. Strategic interactions may arise due
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to a verity of reasons, such as competition in other markets, and result in agents’
actions being strategic substitutes or strategic complements. While prior work has
explored the interaction between information asymmetry and price impact, the inter-
action between information asymmetry, price impact and strategic interactions has
been largely unexplored.
Specifically, we investigate how the type and extent of strategic interactions —
whether it is strategic complementarity or strategic substitutability — shape the
equilibrium actions of market participants and as a result, their price impact, in
the presence of information asymmetry. We consider a model similar to the one in
Chapter 1, but with an additional parameter representing the nature of strategic
interactions between agents. We use a reduced-form approach that allows us to
represent both strategic substitutability and strategic complementarity, that may
result from agents’ activities outside of the market (e.g., spill-overs and externalities).
Our first set of results establishes the existence of a Bayes-Nash equilibrium,
and we characterize the equilibrium in terms of model primitives. We then turn
to a comparative statics analysis. In order to obtain a tractable representation, we
look at the large market limit as the number of agents in the market grows. We
find that the existence of strategic interactions between agents has a direct impact
on the weight agents put on their private information. Specifically, agents put less
weight on their private information as the extent of strategic interaction between
them increases. From the view point of agent i, when the actions of all other agents
j 6= i have a dominant effect on her profit, she is less incentivized to pay attention
to her private information. Put differently, there is a coordination motive (in the
case where agents’ actions are strategic complements), or a miss-coordination motive
(in the case where agents’ actions are strategic substitutes) that offsets the desire to
match the fundamentals.
Our second set of results establishes the relationship between price impact, in-
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formation asymmetry and strategic interactions. We find that there is a monotonic
relation between price impact and information asymmetry: as the extent of infor-
mation asymmetry decreases, price impact decreases. Specifically, as agents’ private
information becomes biased towards the average valuation of the good, the level of in-
formation asymmetry in the market decreases, which results in a decrease in agents’
price impact. We also characterize the relation between price impact and the ex-
tent and nature of strategic interactions. Importantly, this relation depends on the
the slope of agents’ demand curves. When agents submit downward-sloping demand
curves, price impact decreases with the extent of strategic susbstitutability and in-
creases with the extent of strategic complementarity. However, when agents submit
upwords-sloping demand curves, price impact decreases with the extent of strategic
complementarity. This is a consequence of the fact that strategic complements offset
the “price effect”, which induces agents to decrease their demand as price increases.
However, when agents’ actions are strategic substitutes, the strategic effect reinforces
the “price effect”.
Finally, we study the trade-offs of the effects of strategic interaction and infor-
mation asymmetry on agents’ price impact. We find that strategic interaction may
mitigate or exacerbate the effect of information asymmetry on price impact, and it




1.1 Motivation and Overview of Results
There is, by now, unanimity amongst researchers that the design of markets has an
important role in improving market performance. As a result, a growing literature in
the economics and operations management has focused on optimal design of market
in various contexts, such as auctions, two-sided markets, and on-line marketplaces.
However, one aspect that has been over-looked is the possibility of information leak-
age, its interaction with the market design, and the impact it may have on the market
outcomes.
With the advance in technology, information leakage has become ever more rele-
vant. The digitalization of information has made the process of observing and pro-
cessing agents’ actions — by the market maker or the market participants — fairly
easy and fast, resulting in a high possibility of their private information — on which
they rely on when taking their actions — being leaked. This possibility for informa-
tion leakage, in turn, may affect the actions of market participants – whether they
are the agents observing the leaked information or if it is their information that is
being leaked to others. Understanding such effects, their interaction with the market
structure, and their impact on the outcomes is crucial for policy makers and market
designers, who want to guarantee a smooth and efficient operation of the market.
The possibility of information leakage is one of the central features of financial
markets. It is by now conventional wisdom that the private information held by
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various market participants (even anonymous ones for that matter) can be reflected
in a security’s price. Such a possibility has made the role of information in the
“price discovery” process as one of the main concerns of policymakers in designing
market regulations. For instance, in its policy report on the emergence of “dark
pools” for equity trading, the International Organization of Securities Commissions
[36] argued that “[...] where regulators consider permitting different market structures
[...] they should consider the impact of doing so on price discovery [...].” Similarly,
Commissioner Troy A. Paredes from the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
[64] observed that “price discovery matters because investors would be less willing
to invest if the contrarian views of short sellers were not fully incorporated into
securities prices” and that “when price discovery is compromised, we run the risk
that our securities markets allocate capital inefficiently.”
Another prominent example is the class of emissions permits markets in the var-
ious “cap-and-trade” systems implemented around the globe. In brief, a cap is set
on total amount of permitted pollution, while emission allowances within the cap are
distributed to (potential) emitters. The allowances can then be exchanged on a sec-
ondary market. One of the key design objectives of such a scheme is for the price in
the secondary market to reflect the social costs of emissions, thus inducing firms to in-
ternalize the impact of their production decisions. But this means an inefficient price
discovery process can lead to suboptimal budgeting decisions for firms and inefficient
reduction of emissions. Thus, not surprisingly, policymakers consider an accurate
price discovery to be an important concern when designing and implementing these
systems. For instance, according to the [26], “[...]maintaining the functioning and
integrity of the secondary markets as lead venues for price discovery and efficient
allocation should continue to enjoy highest priority when designing a comprehen-
sive auctioning scheme for the trading period 2013–2020 (Phase III).” Despite this
emphasis, studies conducted on data from the European Union Emissions Trading
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System (the world’s first and so far largest cap-and-trade system) indicate that in the
first phase of the implementation in 2005–2007, prices failed to aggregate information
effectively ([24], [61]), resulting in suboptimal market operations.
In this chapter, we take a step towards understanding how the quality of price
discovery in the presence of information leakage can shape the informational and
allocative efficiency of the market. We further try to understand how the extent
of information leakage, and in turn, the quality of price discovery depends on the
market architecture. While building on a large prior literature, we explore a novel
aspect: how heterogeneity in the agent-level (e.g., in terms of agents’ trading costs,
information precision, valuations, and risk attitudes) may interact with the market
price’s role as an endogenous source of public information. We then explore the
implications of price informativeness on allocative efficiency by comparing welfare
across various market architectures.
We base our analysis on a standard model of a uniform price double auction. More
specifically, following [66], we focus on a competitive market consisting of finitely
many agents who trade a single asset. Agents have interdependent valuations for
the asset, but are uncertain about the underlying state that determines the asset’s
payoff. Instead, each agent observes a potentially informative private signal about
the asset fundamental. As in the rational expectations tradition (e.g., [29] and [25]),
the price serves as an endogenous public signal with the ability to (fully or partially)
convey each agent’s private information to other market participants. As our key
assumption, we allow for ex ante heterogeneity in the precision of private signals
and the agents’ preferences, by assuming that agents face potentially heterogeneous
trading costs.
Our first set of results, which serves as the basis for the rest of our analysis, estab-
lishes that the distribution of trading costs has a direct impact on the informativeness
of the price. In particular, we show that, in markets with more than two agents, the
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market is informationally efficient if and only if all trading costs coincide. This result
is a consequence of the fact that introducing a second dimension of heterogeneity (i.e.,
heterogeneity in trading costs in addition to heterogeneity in information sets) leads
to a secondary motive for trade that may be orthogonal to agents’ private informa-
tion: all else equal, agents with higher trading costs trade less intensely on the same
information than those with lower trading costs. This preference-induced heterogene-
ity, in turn, biases the price towards the private signals of agents with lower trading
costs compared to the benchmark with identical traders. In fact, we show that price
informativeness decreases in the (weighted) variance of agents’ trading costs, with
the weights given by the precision of each agents’ private signal. In summary, higher
preference heterogeneity leads to less informative prices.
Given the above observation, our second set of results then establishes that the
reduction in price informativeness also manifests itself as an informational externality.
More specifically, we show that agents do not internalize the impact of their trading
decisions on price informativeness for other traders. Crucially, this informational
externality only exists when agents are heterogeneous: we show the equilibrium is
constrained efficient when all agents have identical trading costs. In contrast, when
agents have heterogeneous trading costs, a subset of agents over-react to their private
signals (compared to the constrained efficient benchmark), whereas the remainder
of the agents under-react, where the sets of over-reacting and under-reacting agents
depend on the underlying model parameters. In particular, whether an agent is over-
reacting or under-reacting depends on (i) how her private signal covaries with the
asset’s payoff estimation error of other traders; and (ii) the slope of agents’ demand
curves. The covariance in (i) captures whether other agents are over-estimating or
under-estimating the true underlying value of the good. Then, the slope of their
demand curves determine how they react to an increase or decrease of the price
resulting from the agent’s action. These two factors, in turn, depend on agents’
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trading costs and on the dominant role played by the price, respectively. When the
informational role of price dominates — i.e., when the main role of the price is as an
endogenous public signal in the market — agents with relatively high trading costs
under-react to their private information, whereas agents with relatively low trading
costs over-react. In contrast, when the main role of the price is as an index of scarcity
— i.e., to match supply and demand — agents with high trading costs over-react to
their private information, and agents with low trading costs under-react.
With the above results in hand, we then leverage the heterogeneity-induced in-
formational externality identified above to study how the interaction of private infor-
mation and market architecture determines social welfare. More specifically, we use
our framework to compare a centralized market architecture to a segmented market
in which agents can only trade with a subset of other individuals. As our main result,
we show that, depending on the distribution of trading costs, a segmented market
architecture can achieve a higher welfare compared to the centralized market. This
is despite the fact that a centralized market provides more trading opportunities and
— at least in principle — should lead to higher levels of price informativeness as the
price can aggregate the private information of a larger set of individuals. Nonetheless,
our results establish that if market centralization leads to sufficiently high levels of
heterogeneity, not only price informativeness may decline, but also this decline in the
quality of information aggregation and the corresponding informational externality
may reduce the welfare in the centralized market below that in the segmented market
architecture. Thus, policies that shape the distribution of agents that participate in
the market can have a first-order effect on the efficient operations of the market.
Overall, our theoretical findings provide insight on the role of information leakage
through prices in shaping market outcomes, and how it may depend on the intricate
details of the market. They also suggest that information leakage may have first-




Our theoretical framework is related to the literature on rational expectations equilib-
rium with a Gaussian information structure, such as [33], [29], [3], [25] and [46], among
many others1. Within this literature, our work is most closely related to [57], who
study a market consisting of traders with identical trading costs but heterogeneous
pairwise correlations in valuations. In line with our findings for a model with hetero-
geneous trading costs, they establish that heterogeneity in pairwise correlations can
break informational efficiency. However, unlike our framework, the failure of informa-
tion aggregation in their model does not translate into an informational externality:
even though the market cannot fully reveal the information to all traders, neither
can a social planner who has to respect the decentralized information structure of the
economy.2 The disparity between the results of [57] and our findings is driven by the
distinct origins of informational inefficiencies in the two models. More specifically, in
the presence of heterogeneous pairwise correlations, the price cannot fully aggregate
information because there is no single one-dimensional statistic that can serve as a
sufficient statistic for all market participants simultaneously. In contrast, our model
admits such a common sufficient statistic. Yet, heterogeneity in trading costs leads
to an equilibrium price that does not coincide with this statistic.
Information leakage effects have also been studied by the supply chain manage-
ment literature. [47] studies the possibility that confidentially-shared information
between a retailer and a manufacturer may be leaked to other retailers as they ob-
serve the manufacturer’s actions. The leaked information, in turn, may affect the
1For an extensive review of the early models see [65], chapters 3-4, and for a more recent literature
review see [59].
2We formally establish this claim in Section 1.7.
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strategies of the other retailers, even though they were not part of the information
sharing agreement. Relatedly, [8] emphasize the importance of “strategic information
management,” according to which firms take the possibility of information leakage to
competitors into account, while [44] study revenue-sharing contracts that can mitigate
the negative effect of information leakage in the supply chain.
Our work is also related to the literature on optimal information revelation in
disclosure policies in the context of platforms and queues. [17] focus on the opti-
mal information disclosure policy of a contest designer regarding the competitors’
progress. Relatedly, [53] study the problem of optimal information provision of on-
line platforms that collect and disseminate consumers’ experiences, while [20] study
the problem of optimal information revelation in a setting of a social networking plat-
form facing the trade-off between engagement and misinformation. In the context of
queues, [30], [40], and [5], among others study the effect of different information
revelation methods on customers and on the overall performance of the system. In
contrast to this literature, where there exists a platform or a service system who
controls the nature of the information provision, in our setting, there is no entity who
controls for the amount of information revealed, but rather it is determined by the
way that prices incorporate and convey information, from and to market participants.
A growing literature has been studying another channel for endogenous public
information — ratings and reviews — through which customers can learn about
the value of different products and services. For example, [62], [16], [1], and [35]
investigate how successful is the learning process in terms of learning the true value
of the products. While related, our work departures from this literature as we allow
for learning from prices.
Our work is also related to the literature on informational efficiency and allocative
efficiency of markets. For example, [55] studies the general tension between the two
notions in a setting of auctions. In a multi-unit auction model with a finite number
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of bidders, the more sensitive bids are to private information, the more information is
aggregated in the price but also the greater is the allocative inefficiency. However, in
the limit (of the number of items and bidders) [55] shows that both are attained – full
information aggregation and allocative efficiency. [37] look at predictions markets in
a dynamic setting. They show that when all traders are risk-averse, although prices
reflect risk-adjusted probabilities, under some smoothness condition, the allocation
is ex-post Pareto efficient. In addition, they show that information is aggregated
in the sense that an uninformed observer of the market, sharing only the common
knowledge of market participants can infer the true probabilities.
Also related is the literature on efficient use of public versus private information.
[52] show that in a game with strategic complementarities, agents might over-react
to public information, and so releasing more public information can reduce social
welfare. [9] generalize the model in [52] and study for different economies the efficient
use of public information. As opposed to our model, they consider exogenous public
information, and so the weight agents put on their private information does not affect
the content of the public signal.
Our work is also related to the literature that studies the implications of learning
from endogenous signals and the resulting informational externalities. For instance,
[6] illustrates how in the presence of strategic complementaries, providing agents with
more precise signals can reduce the informational efficiency of the price system. Re-
latedly, [11] show that over-the-counter trade can lead to an informational externality,
as traders do not internalize how their trading decisions impact the information set
of other market participants.3
Finally, our results on the welfare implications of various market architectures are
related to the work of [49], who argue that when agents can exert market power, frag-
3Other examples include [7] and [67], among others.
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mentation of centralized markets may increase aggregate welfare.4 In contrast to this
paper, we assume that all traders are competitive, but instead allow them to learn
from endogenous public signals, i.e., prices. This channel creates an informational
externality, whose magnitude is closely tied to the market architecture. As such, a
transition from centralized to segmented markets impacts equilibrium price informa-
tiveness, thus leading potentially higher aggregate welfare. Also related is the recent
work of [38] who look at the impact of introducing dark pools to financial markets on
welfare. In other words, what are the welfare implications of having these ”closed”
markets in addition to the open market (i.e., an exchange). They show the answer is
ambiguous and depends on the intrinsic value of traders and the mass of speculators.
Thus, similar to our work, they show that a centralized open market may be inferior
to a more decentralized market with respect to welfare.
1.3 Model
Consider a market consisting of n agents, denoted by {1, 2, . . . , n}, who trade a di-
visible good. These agents may correspond to firms trading emissions permits in a
secondary market in a cap-and-trade scheme or traders buying and selling assets in
financial markets. The realized payoff of agent i who obtains xi units of the good is
given by





i − pxi, (1.1)
where p denotes the price of the good and θi, which we refer to as i’s valuation, is
a random variable that is drawn from the standard normal distribution. We allow
for interdependence in traders’ valuations by assuming that corr(θi, θj) = ρ for all
pairs of agents i 6= j, where ρ ∈ [0, 1). This formulation thus nests the cases with
4Other recent contributions on the welfare consequences of market architecture include [27], who
argue that the introduction of trade frictions can increase predictability in trading encounters.
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independent (ρ = 0) and common (ρ → 1) valuations as special cases. We refer to
parameter λi in (1.1) as agent i’s trading cost and treat the collection of parameters
(λ1, . . . , λn) as a primitive of the model, which we assume to be commonly known to
all agents.
In the context of financial markets, θi represents the dividend of the traded asset,
xi is the quantity of the asset purchased by trader i, and the trading cost λi can arise
due to transaction taxes, inventory costs for holding the asset, or other costs incurred
as a consequence of trade. Alternatively, to interpret equation (1.1) in the context of
the emissions permits market, suppose each polluter i can produce one unit of output
per one unit of pollution permit. Thus, to produce xi units of output, which results
in a revenue of θixi, polluter i incurs a cost pxi to obtain the required permits as well
as a quadratic production cost λix
2
i /2. Regardless of the interpretation, equation
(1.1) represents a market consisting of agents with interdependent valuations and
potentially heterogeneous costs.
Prior to trading, each agent i observes a noisy private signal si = θi + εi about
her valuation, where εi ∼ N(0, σ2i ) are mutually independent and σi parametrizes i’s
uncertainty about θi. Under this specification, all signals (s1, . . . , sn) are informative
about agent i’s valuation as long as ρ 6= 0 and σi > 0.
The good/asset is supplied by a competitive market of outside agents, represented
by the inverse aggregate supply function p = α + β
∑n
i=1 xi, where α and β are non-
negative constants and
∑n
i=1 xi is the (inside) agents’ aggregate demand for the good.
Such an inverse supply function can arise by assuming that, in addition to the n
traders discussed above, the market contains a representative outside agent, indexed
0, with payoff
π0(y) = αy − βy2/2− py, (1.2)
where y is the total units of the good purchased by the outside agent.5 In the context
5In parallel with traders indexed 1 through n, one can interpret α and β as the outside agent’s
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of the emissions permits market, the outside agent can be though of as the government
or regulator supplying the asset, with αy− βy2/2 capturing the social cost of y units
of emissions. Market clearing requires that the traders’ aggregate demand and the
demand of the outside agent satisfy y +
∑n
i=1 xi = 0.
Trade occurs via a one-shot, uniform-price double auction mechanism, according
to which all agents simultaneously submit demand schedules that specify their de-
mand for the asset as a function of the price p. Under such a trading mechanism, the
strategy of trader i ∈ {1, . . . , n} is a mapping xi(si, p) from her private information
and the price to a quantity, whereas the strategy of the representative outside agent
is a function y(p) that specifies his demand at any given price p. The price is then
determined by the submitted demand functions and the market-clearing condition.
The competitive equilibrium of this market is defined in the usual way: it con-
sists of a collection of demand schedules xi(si, p) and y(p) such that (i) each trader
i ∈ {1, . . . , n} maximizes her expected payoff conditional on her information set
{si, p} while taking the price as given, (ii) the representative outside agent maxi-
mizes his payoff given the price, and (iii) the market clears. Throughout, we restrict
our attention to equilibria in linear strategies, according to which each agent i’s de-
mand schedule is an affine function of her private signal si and the market price
p.
Before presenting our results, a few remarks are in order. First, note that the
assumption that agents submit price-contingent demand schedules enables them to
take the information content of the price into account, thus paving the way for the
possibility of information leakage in the market: the price can serve as an endogenous
public signal with the ability to (fully or partially) convey agents’ private informa-
tion to one another. Second, the absence of noise traders in our framework enables us
to perform a well-defined welfare analysis. Such an analysis will be instrumental in
valuation and trading cost, respectively.
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disentangling the market’s informational inefficiency from its allocative inefficiency.
Finally, our assumption that agents are price takers ensures that the inefficiencies
identified by the welfare analysis are not driven by market power or other depar-
tures from the competitive benchmark. Our main results on information leakage and
the market’s informational inefficiency extend to settings where agents exert market
power.
We have the following result:
Proposition 1.1. There exists an equilibrium in linear strategies xi = aisi+ bi− cip,
where the coefficients corresponding to trader i’s strategy depend on the price via
λiai =
var(p)− E[psi]E[pθi]




E[s2i ] var(p)− E2[psi]
E[p] (1.4)
λici = 1 +
E[psi]− E[s2i ]E[pθi]
E[s2i ] var(p)− E2[psi]
(1.5)









Furthermore, coefficients (a1, . . . , an) are independent of parameters α and β.
The above result, which will serve as the basis for the rest of our analysis, provides
an implicit characterization of agents’ equilibrium strategies and market-clearing price
as a function of trading costs and signal precisions.6 Despite the implicit nature of
Proposition 1.1, a few observations are immediate. First, equation (1.6) establishes
that the price is an affine function of all traders’ private signals, thus formalizing
the idea that the equilibrium price is an endogenous public signal, with the weighted
average
∑n
k=1 aksk serving as a sufficient statistic for the information content of the
6Even though not explicit, the traders’ signal precisions are reflected in the various variance
and covariance terms between θi, si, and p. We explore these relationships in detail in subsequent
sections.
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price. Second, the fact that coefficients (a1, . . . , an) are independent of α and β
implies that even though the price level depends on the characteristics of the outside
agent, its information content does not. Third and most importantly, the expression
in (1.6) illustrates that various agents’ private signals do not impact the information
content of the price symmetrically. Rather, the price is biased towards the private
signals of agents who assign larger weights on their signals in equilibrium. In view
of equations (1.3)–(1.5), this observation implies that, in general, equilibrium price
informativeness may depend on the entire profile of trading costs (λ1, . . . , λn) and
signal precisions (σ−11 , . . . , σ
−1
n ), an issue which will be the main focus of Section 1.4.
As a final remark, we note that the expression in (1.5) underscores the trade-off
between the two roles played by the price: (i) as a measure of the opportunity cost of
obtaining an extra unit of the asset and (ii) as a potentially informative endogenous
public signal about the asset’s underlying payoff. In particular, when the price is
uninformative about the underlying state (i.e., when σi = 0 or ρ = 0), equation
(1.5) implies that ci = 1/λi (the second term on the right-hand side of (1.5) equals
zero), reflecting the opportunity cost for agent i. In this case, agents’ demand slopes
depend only on their trading costs, and so the demand of agents with lower trading
costs is more elastic than the demand of agents with higher trading costs (the latter
trade more conservatively). On the other hand, the informational role of the price is
captured by the second term on the right-hand side of (1.5): if the price contains some
information about θi above and beyond agent i’s private information, she infers that
a higher p reflects a higher payoff, thus reducing her opportunity cost of obtaining
the asset. This reduction in opportunity cost is reflected as a smaller coefficient ci in
equilibrium. Put differently, the slope of the demand curve submitted by agent i not
only reflects i’s opportunity cost of trade, but also her desire to utilize the information
contained in the price in her demand. Importantly, the relative importance of the
two roles played by the price depends on the slope of the inverse aggregate supply
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function β. For small values of β, the price level is insensitive to the aggregate demand∑n
k=1 xk. Thus, while a small increase in the price does not change the marginal cost
of acquiring the asset, such an increase is interpreted by the market as a strong
positive signal about the asset’s underlying value. As a result, the informational role
of the price dominates, inducing the agents to submit upward-sloping demand curves
(ci < 0). In contrast, when β is large, the price is very sensitive to the aggregate
demand
∑n
k=1 xk. As a result, an increase in demand by an agent in the market —
say, due to a positive signal —results in a sharp increase in the price, which induces
other agents to purchase less of the asset. In other words, the role of the price as a
measure of opportunity cost of the asset dominates its informational role, inducing
downward-sloping demand curves (ci > 0).
1.4 Information Leakage and Informational
Efficiency
With the equilibrium characterization in Proposition 1.1 in hand, we now turn to
studying how model primitives, and in particular, the profile of trading costs and
signal precisions, shape the informational content of the price and hence the market’s
informational efficiency. Throughout, we rely on the following notion of informational
efficiency:
Definition 1.1. The equilibrium is fully privately revealing to trader i if E[θi|si, p] =
E[θi|s1, ..., sn].
In other words, under full private revelation, the price coupled with agent i’s
private signal serve as a sufficient statistic for all the information dispersed throughout
the market. We say the market is informationally efficient if the equilibrium is fully
privately revealing to all agents simultaneously. Thus, in an informationally efficient
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market, the leakage of information via the price is complete. We have the following
result:
Proposition 1.2. Suppose ρ 6= 0 and σi > 0 for all traders i. The market is infor-
mationally efficient if and only if either
(i) there are only two agents in the market (i.e., n = 2); or
(ii) all trading costs coincide (i.e., λ1 = · · · = λn).
The above result thus establishes that when all agents have identical trading costs,
the leakage of information is complete, in the sense that all agents behave as if they
had access to all the private information held by other agents in the market. This is
the case regardless of the profile of signal precisions (σ1, . . . , σn) and hence how private
information is initially distributed among the agents. Additionally, Proposition 1.2
also shows that in a market consisting of n ≥ 3 agent, any heterogeneity in trading
costs would make the equilibrium price to be less than fully revealing to at least one
market participant.
To see the intuition underlying this result, consider the special case in which all
signals are of equal precision, that is, σi = σ for all i. In such an environment,
it is immediate that full private revelation requires the equilibrium price to be a
sufficient statistic for the unweighted average of all traders’ private signals, i.e., p =
d0 + d1
∑n
k=1 sk for some constants d0 and d1, where d1 6= 0. Yet, as we established
in Proposition 1.1, the equilibrium price reflects
∑n
k=1 aksk, where the coefficient ak
depends on the entire profile of trading costs (λ1, . . . , λn). Thus, as long as there are
a pair of traders i and j with non-identical trading costs, the equilibrium price would
reflect a weighted average of private signals, making the extraction of the unweighted
average of the signals and hence full revelation impossible. Note, however, that this
argument is no longer valid if n = 2. In that case, each trader can back out the
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private signal of the other trader from the price (which reveals a1s1 + a2s2) and her
own signal, irrespective of the coefficients a1 and a2.
We remark that the failure of information aggregation established in Proposition
1.2 is distinct from the reasons behind partial revelation in [39] and [57]. [39] illus-
trates that equilibrium is generically inconsistent with the efficient market hypothesis
when “the dimension of the signal space is larger than the number of assets,” or in
other words, when the dimension of payoff-relevant variables exceeds the number of
prices. On the other hand, [57] construct a class of models under which there is no
single statistic that can simultaneously serve as a sufficient statistic for all agents in
the market. In contrast to these papers, in our environment, the (single-dimensional)
linear combination S̄ =
∑n
k=1 sk/(1 − ρ + σ2k) is a sufficient statistic for all the in-
formation in the market for all traders simultaneously. In particular, it is easy to
verify that E[θi|si, S̄] = E[θi|s1, ..., sn] for all i. Yet the equilibrium price does not
coincide with this statistic. This failure of information aggregation is a consequence
of agents’ equilibrium actions: the heterogeneity in trading costs induces a dispersion
in agents’ trading intensity that is orthogonal to their private signals, thus biasing
the information content of the price towards the private information of agents with
lower trading costs.
Proposition 1.2 thus illustrates that the nature and extent of information leakage
in the market is highly sensitive to the distribution of agents’ trading costs. Our next
result provides a refinement of this observation by relating the extent of informational
inefficiency in the market to the distribution of agents’ trading costs. For each trader
i, define the information revelation gap as
φi =
var(θi|si, p)− var(θi|s1, . . . , sn)
var(θi|si)− var(θi|s1, . . . , sn)
. (1.7)
This index, which is always a number between 0 and 1 measures the extent to which
the price reduces agent i’s uncertainty relative to a benchmark with no informational
asymmetry. More specifically, φi = 0 whenever the equilibrium is fully privately
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revealing to agent i, whereas φi = 1 if the price does not provide agent i with any
new information above and beyond her private signal si.
7
Our next result relates each agent’s information revelation gap to the distribution
of trading costs in the market.
















k 6=iwk (1/λk − 1/Λi)
2∑
k 6=iwk
are, respectively, the weighted harmonic mean and weighted variance of the reciprocal
of trading costs of agents k 6= i with weights wk = 1/var(sk).
The above result thus provides a refinement of Proposition 1.2 (for small values
of ρ) by linking the information content of the price to the distribution of trading
costs in the market. More specifically, it illustrates that, keeping the harmonic mean
of trading costs Λi constant, an increase in the heterogeneity Σi in the trading costs
of agents k 6= i widens i’s information revelation gap. In contrast, when agents
k 6= i have identical trading costs, equation (1.8) implies that the equilibrium is fully
privately revealing to agent i (φi = 0), thus recovering Proposition 1.2(ii) as a special
case. Also note that, in line with condition (i) of Proposition 1.2, the above result
implies that φi = 0 when there are only two agents in the market, irrespective of their
trading costs.
The characterization in Proposition 1.3 also underscores that the extent of infor-
mation leakage depends on the joint distribution of agents’ trading costs and signal
7Our notion of information revelation gap as a measure of price informativeness is distinct, but
closely related to what [57] refer to as the index of price informativeness. More specifically, their
index, ψi, measures the contribution of the price signal to the reduction of i’s uncertainty relative to
the complete information benchmark with no uncertainty. In contrast, φi in equation (1.7) measures
i’s residual uncertainty relative to the benchmark of full revelation. Formally, the two indices are
related to one another via ψi = (1− φi)(1− var(θi|s1, . . . , sn)/var(θi|si)).
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precisions. In particular, equation (1.8) establishes that the information revelation
gap φi depends not on the dispersion of trading costs, but rather on a weighted vari-
ance of the reciprocal of trading costs of agents k 6= i with weights wk = 1/var(sk).
This expression captures the idea that agent k’s trading cost matters for revelation
only to the extent that she posses informative signals, with the trading cost of agents
with uninformative signals assigned a weight wk = 0.
1.4.1 Large Markets
Our results thus far focused on a market consisting of finitely many agents. We
conclude this section by studying the model’s behavior at its continuum limit and
illustrating that, as long as all agents are informationally small, the market is infor-
mationally inefficient unless the distribution of trading costs is degenerate.
Formally, we consider a sequence of markets indexed by the number of agents n
and focus on the limit as n → ∞. Let λin and σin respectively denote the trading
cost and the standard deviation of noise in agent i’s signal in the market consisting of
n agents, with their joint empirical distribution denoted by Fn(λ, σ). We use Fn(λ)





n) = F(λ, σ) (1.9)
for all λ and σ, with F(0, σ) = 0 for all σ. This assumption serves a dual pur-
pose. First, it ensures that the limiting market is well-defined, with almost all agents
exhibiting a non-zero trading cost. Second and more importantly, as in [15], the
normalization constant 1/
√
n on the left-hand side of (1.9) guarantees that each
agent is informationally small as n → ∞: the variance of noise σ2in in each agent
i’s signal grows linearly in n. Intuitively, this normalization implies that the ag-
gregate amount of information dispersed among all agents remains bounded even






i=1 θin is the average of agents’ valuations and skn denotes the private
signal of agent k in the market with n agents. We have the following result:
Proposition 1.4. Let φin denote the information revelation gap of agent i in the
market consisting of n traders. Then, φ∗ = limn→∞ φin = 0 if and only if the marginal
distribution F(λ) is degenerate.
The above result thus implies that even when the number of agents participating
in the market is very large, as long as the aggregate amount of information dispersed
throughout the market is bounded, the equilibrium is fully privately revealing if and
only if all agents have identical trading costs.
1.5 Informational Externality
Propositions 1.2–1.4 in the previous section illustrate that, as long as n ≥ 3, the
equilibrium is not fully privately revealing to all market participants simultaneously
unless all agents have identical trading costs. These results, however, are silent about
the (in)efficiency of the equilibrium allocation. In this section, we study the welfare
implications of the market’s failure to aggregate information and show that hetero-
geneity in the market can lead to the emergence of an informational externality,
whereby traders do not internalize how their actions shape the information content
of the price. This analysis will serve as the basis of our results in Section 1.6 on the
welfare implications of various market architectures with endogenous public signals.
We consider the constrained efficiency benchmark of [9, 10], according to which
the social planner maximizes total expected surplus in the market




subject to the same informational constraints faced by the agents in equilibrium,
where recall that πi denotes trader i’s payoff and π0 is the payoff of the outside
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agent. Under this specification, the action prescribed to each agent cannot depend
on the private information of other agents. Thus, this formulation ensures that the
planner internalizes any potential externality that agents may impose on one another
while respecting the decentralized information structure of the market.8 As in the
equilibrium, we restrict the planner to affine strategies in the form of xi = aisi+bi−cip,
while imposing the market-clearing condition y +
∑n
i=1 xi = 0.
We have the following result:
Proposition 1.5. Suppose σ2i > 0 for all i. The equilibrium is constrained efficient
if either
(i) there are only two agents in the market (i.e., n = 2);
(ii) agents have private valuations (i.e., ρ = 0); or
(iii) all traders have identical trading costs (i.e., λ1 = · · · = λn).
If the above conditions are violated, then the equilibrium is constrained inefficient for
almost all β.
The above result thus provides a necessary and sufficient condition for constrained
efficiency of the equilibrium allocation. More specifically, Proposition 1.5 establishes
that if either condition (i)–(iii) is satisfied, then the social planner cannot improve on
the equilibrium allocation without violating the decentralized information structure
of the market. Contrasting this observation with Proposition 1.2 illustrates that these
conditions are identical to the conditions that guarantee the market’s informational
efficiency: in a market with n ≥ 3 agents, the equilibrium attains both informational
and allocative efficiency when all agents have identical trading costs.9
8This concept bypasses the details of specific policy instruments and instead directly identifies
the strategy that maximizes welfare under the restriction that information cannot be centralized.
9The equivalence between informational and allocative efficiency does not hold in general. See
Section 1.7 for a slight variation of the model along the lines of [57], in which the equilibrium is
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More importantly for our purposes, however, the juxtaposition of Propositions
1.2 and 1.5 also establishes a converse implication: within our environment, any
heterogeneity in trading costs not only leads to an informational inefficiency, but also
a constrained inefficient allocation. In other words, as long as there is a pair of agents
i and j with λi 6= λj, the market exhibits an externality that is not fully internalized
by the market participants in equilibrium. Crucially, this externality is absent if
agents have either perfect information (σi = 0) or private valuations (ρ = 0). Under
either scenario, the price cannot provide the agents with any useful information. This
simple observation thus implies that the heterogeneity-induced externality identified
in Proposition 1.5 is an informational externality : agents do not internalize how their
actions shape the information content of the endogenous public signal.
To see the intuition for the relationship between heterogeneity and the emergence
of the informational externality, first consider the case in which all agents have identi-
cal trading costs. Since such a market is informationally efficient, any deviation from
the equilibrium strategies can only reduce price informativeness, thus implying that
the social planner cannot improve on the equilibrium allocation. In contrast, when
the distribution of trading costs is non-degenerate, a marginal deviation by agent i
away from her equilibrium strategy results in a second-order loss in i’s payoff, but
potentially a first-order gain in price informativeness for other market participants
and hence a first-order increase in aggregate welfare. Our next result captures how
this informational externality manifests itself:
Proposition 1.6. A marginal deviation by agent i away from the equilibrium weight
she assigns on her private signal leads to a first-order change in aggregate welfare
constrained efficient even though the price is not fully privately revealing to any of the market par-
ticipants, i.e., φi > 0 for all i. In other words, even though informational efficiency in a competitive
market implies allocative efficiency (as argued by [28]), the converse is not generally true. This
means that taking informational efficiency as a proxy for allocative efficiency — without performing


















where γ > 0 is some positive constant.
The above result provides a characterization for how changes in the equilibrium
strategy of agent i shapes the total surplus in the market as a function of slope of
demand curves submitted by any given agent k (∂xk/∂p) and the covariance between
agent i’s private signal and k’s estimation error ek = θk−E[θk|sk, p]. Before exploring
the intuition underlying equation (1.10), we first note that the right-hand side of this
equation is equal to zero whenever the market is informationally efficient. This is a
consequence of the fact that when the price is fully privately revealing to agent k,
then there cannot be a systematic relationship between k’s estimation error and i’s
private signal (as otherwise the equilibrium could not have been privately revealing
to k). To see this formally, note that, under full private revelation to agent k, the
covariance between i’s private signal and k’s estimation error is given by
cov(si, ek) = E[siθk]− E[siE[θk|sk, p]] = E[siθk]− E[E[siθk|sk, p]] = 0,
where the second equality is a consequence of the fact that the price is fully reveal-
ing to agent k (and hence already reflects agent i’s private signal), whereas the last
equality is a consequence of the law of iterated expectations. Thus, Proposition 1.6
substantiates the relationship between Propositions 1.2 and 1.5 discussed earlier in
this section: the same conditions that guarantee informational efficiency also guar-
antee an efficient allocation in the market.
More importantly, the characterization in Proposition 1.6 also illustrates that
when the equilibrium is not fully privately revealing, the nature of the informational
externality depends on the interaction between the above covariance and the slopes of
the equilibrium demand curves. To see this in the most transparent manner, consider
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a scenario with incomplete information leakage and suppose that cov(si, ek) > 0
between a pair of agents i 6= k. This means that whenever agent i has higher signals,
agent k tends to underestimate the true underlying value of the asset. If, in addition,
agent k submits upward-sloping demand curves (so that ∂xk/∂p > 0), then a marginal
increase in agent i’s trading intensity would raise the price, thus inducing agent
k to acquire more of the asset exactly in the states of the world in which k was
underestimating its value. This increases k’s utility. In contrast, if agent k submits
downward-sloping demand curves (i.e., ∂xk/∂p < 0), then by putting a marginally
higher weight on her private signal, agent i increases the price and induces agent k to
acquire less of the good exactly when the latter was underestimating the asset’s value.
This reduces k’s utility. An analogous argument shows that when cov(si, ek) < 0,
a marginal increase in ai decreases k’s utility when k’s demand curve is upward
sloping, whereas it increases k’s utility when k’s demand is downward sloping. Finally,
note that the equilibrium is constrained efficient as long as traders’ strategies are
not indexed to the price (i.e., ∂xk/∂p = 0), in which case the model reduces to a
competition in quantities as opposed to schedules10.
Our next result explores the implications of Proposition 1.6 by relating the mar-
ket’s allocative efficiency to the distribution of agents’ trading costs in the market.
Proposition 1.7. Let aeqi and a
eff
i denote the weights that i assigns to her private
signal in equilibrium and constrained efficient allocations, respectively. There exist
ρ̄ > 0 and functions β(ρ) < β(ρ) such that
(a) if ρ < ρ̄ and β < β, then aeqi < a
eff
























10We formally establish this in Section 1.8.
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(b) if ρ < ρ̄ and β > β, then aeqi < a
eff

















where wk = 1/(1 + σ
2
k).
The above result therefore characterizes the set of traders that over- and under-
react to their private signals. It shows that not all departures from the efficient
strategy profile are in the same direction: while some traders over-react to their
private signals in equilibrium, others under-react relative to the constrained efficient
benchmark. Importantly, proposition 1.7 also illustrates that whether any given
agent i over- or under-reacts to her private signal also depends on the value of β. For
example, agents with large trading costs under-react to their private signals when β
is small, the same agents over-react to their signals when β is large.
It is instructive to interpret Proposition 1.7 through the prism of Proposition 1.6.
To this end, suppose β is small and consider an agent i with the largest trading cost.
Our discussion in Section 1.4 indicates that the private signal of such an agent is re-
flected in the price with a small weight ai relative to the sufficient statistic that would
have resulted in full private revelation to all agents. This under-reflection means that
when agent i has a strong positive signal, other agents tend to underestimate the
value of the asset, thus implying that cov(si, ek) > 0. On the other hand, recall from
the discussion following Proposition 1.1 that a small β means that the informational
role of the price dominates its role as an index of scarcity and as a result leads to
upward-sloping demand curves, as agents interpret higher prices as strong signals in
favor of the asset’s underlying value. Thus, by Proposition 1.6, an increase in ai
induces all other agents to acquire more of the asset when they underestimate its
value, thus increasing the overall welfare in the market. This is indeed the statement
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of Proposition 1.7(a). In contrast, for large values of β, the informational role of the
price is weakened, resulting in downward-sloping demand curves. Hence, equation
(1.10) indicates that a marginal increase in ai would reduce the welfare of all other
agents, consistent with Proposition 1.7(b).
Taken together, Propositions 1.6 and 1.7 illustrate that, in the presence of informa-
tion leakage, the efficient operation of the market is highly sensitive to (i) the extent
of market’s informational efficiency and (ii) the relative importance of the price’s
informational and allocative roles, parameterized by parameter β in our setting.
1.6 Information Leakage and Market
Architecture
Our results in Section 1.5 illustrate that the price’s role as an endogenous public sig-
nal leads to the emergence of an informational externality whenever the distribution
of trading costs is non-degenerate. In this section, we study how this externality can
lead to non-trivial implications by comparing welfare across various market architec-
tures. More specifically, we consider two market architectures, one centralized and
one segmented, and show that market centralization may reduce price informative-
ness by strengthening the informational externality, thus resulting in a reduction of
aggregate welfare compared to a segmented market architecture.
To this end, fix the set of traders {1, . . . , n} with profile of trading costs (λ1, . . . , λn)
and signal precisions (σ−11 , . . . , σ
−1
n ) and consider two different market architectures:
a centralized architecture in which all trade occurs on the same exchange with a single
market-clearing price — as in the model studied thus far — and a segmented market
architecture in which each trader can only trade in one of the multiple exchanges
with a specific subset of other market participants. Formally, the segmented market
architecture is defined as a partition S = {S1, . . . , Sm} of the set of traders {1, . . . , n}
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for some m ≥ 2, with trader i ∈ Sk only capable of trading with other traders j ∈ Sk.
Thus, as in [49], each segment Sk in the segmented market architecture has a separate
market-clearing price. To ensure consistency between the centralized and decentral-
ized architectures, we also assume that a fraction ζk ∈ [0, 1] of outside traders are
also active in segment Sk, with
∑m
k=1 ζk = 1.
We start with the following benchmark result:
Proposition 1.8. Expected welfare in the centralized market architecture is higher
than the segmented architecture, if either of the following conditions are satisfied:
(i) all traders have complete information about their valuations (σi = 0);
(ii) traders’ valuations are independent (ρ = 0);
(iii) all trading costs are identical.
Proposition 1.8 provides a benchmark for the comparison between various market
architectures. In particular, it establishes that as long as the market is informationally
efficient — which occurs either because market participants have no use for the private
information of other traders or when they all have identical trading costs — then
market centralization leads to a higher aggregate welfare. This increase in welfare
operates via two distinct channels. First, market centralization enables each agent
to trade in a market consisting of a larger number of participants, thus leading to
further realization of gains from trade. This is the channel that underlies the gains
from centralization in cases (i) and (ii) above. Second, in the case that traders can
benefit from other market participants’ private information — as in case (iii) above —
market centralization means that the price aggregates the private signals of a larger
number of traders, thus increasing price informativeness for all agents and hence
welfare.
With Proposition 1.8 as the benchmark, our next result provides a comparison
between the two market architectures in the presence of trader heterogeneity. For
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any trader i in the centralized architecture, define mceni =
∑
j 6=i 1/var(sj). Similarly
for the segmented architecture, let msegi =
∑
j∈S(i)\{i} 1/var(sj), where S(i) denotes
the segment that agent i can trade in. We have the following result:
Proposition 1.9. There exist constants ρ > 0 and β > 0 such that if ρ < ρ and
β < β, then expected welfare in the centralized market structure is higher than the


















where φceni and φ
seg
i are trader i’s information revelation gaps in the centralized and
segmented markets, respectively.
To see the intuition of the above result, consider agent i. The term mceni −
msegi , which is always positive, measures how much more information is available to
agent i post centralization if the information is fully aggregated. But the extent of
information aggregation depends on the market structure. The second term on the
left-hand side of (1.11) creates a countervailing force that may reduce and even reverse
the welfare gains from centralization. The juxtaposition of the above result with
Proposition 1.3 relates welfare gains in centralizing the markets to the heterogeneity
in each segment and the market in general. Furthermore, the above result reduces
to part (iii) of Proposition 1.8 when all trading costs are identical, in which case
φceni = φ
seg
i = 0 for all i, implying that E[W cen] ≥ E[W seg]. On the other hand, when
(1.11) is violated, we get the opposite. Finally, each term is also weighed by trader i’s
trading cost: clearly traders with high trading costs will trade less and hence matter
less for aggregate welfare.
The result above thus implies that policies that shape the distribution of agents
that participate in the market, which in turn, shapes price informativeness can have
a first-order effect on the efficient operations of the market.
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1.7 Informationally-Inefficient Efficient Markets
Our results in this chapter establish that when trading costs are heterogeneous, (i)
the price signal does not fully aggregate the information in the market and (ii) the
equilibrium is constrained inefficient, as traders do not internalize the impact of their
trading decisions on the information content of the price. In other words, the equilib-
rium is both informational and allocative inefficient. In this section, we show that, in
general, incomplete aggregation of information does not necessarily imply allocative
inefficiency. We illustrate this by contrasting our results to a variation of the model of
[57], where traders have homogeneous trading costs but are asymmetric in the corre-
lation between their private valuations. More specifically, we show that even though
such heterogeneity leads to an incomplete aggregation of information, the equilibrium
is constrained efficient, in the sense that the social planner cannot improve on the
allocation.
As in the baseline model in Section 1.3, consider a market consisting of n price-
taking traders with payoffs given by (1.1) and private signals si = θi + εi, where
εi ∼ N (0, σ2i ). As in our baseline model, the assumption that traders take the
price as given guarantees that any potential inefficiency is not driven by traders’
market power. In a departure from the baseline model, however, suppose that the
interdependencies in private valuations can be heterogeneous among different pairs





ρij = ρ̄ (1.12)
for some ρ̄ ∈ (0, 1) and all traders i. This assumption ensures that all traders face
the same average interdependencies in the market. We have the following result:
Proposition 1.10. Suppose pairwise correlations satisfy (1.12). Also suppose all
trading costs and signal precisions coincide. Then,
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(i) The equilibrium is fully privately revealing to all traders if and only if ρij = ρ̄
for all i 6= j.
(ii) The equilibrium is constrained efficient, regardless of the pairwise correlations.
The first statement of the above proposition, which is in line with Proposition
3 of [57], illustrates that heterogeneity in pairwise correlations prevents full private
revelation in the sense of Definition 1.1. This is a consequence of the fact that full
private revelation for trader i requires the price to be equal to a specific weighted
average of private signals. But the presence of heterogeneous correlations means that
this weight average may be different for different traders, implying that at least one
trader cannot fully extract the sufficient statistic of other traders’ private signals by
observing the price.
More importantly for our purposes however, part (ii) of Proposition 1.10 illustrates
that the failure of informational efficiency highlighted in part (i) may not translate
into allocative inefficiency: no matter what the pairwise correlations are, all traders
internalize the impact of their actions on others and no policy can improve upon
the equilibrium allocation. This result thus underscores that equating informational
efficiency with allocative efficiency — without performing a proper welfare analysis
— can lead to misleading conclusions.
1.8 Comparison with Cournot Competition
We conclude this chapter with a comparison to a market in which agents engage
in Cournot competition. More specifically, we consider an economy, in which agents
compete by choosing quantities instead of submitting demand schedules, as in Section
1.3. We will show that while the later market structure results in an inefficient market,
the former results in an efficient one. This emphasizes that the source for inefficiency
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in our model is an informational externality, resulting from the fact that agents use
the price as an endogenous public signal.
To that end, consider an economy consisting of n traders competing in quantities
contingent only on their private signals. Thus, xi is of the form xi = aisi + bi for
i ∈ {1, ..., n}. In equilibrium, traders maximize their expected profit, given by





i − pxi|si] (1.13)
and the price is such that the market clears, i.e., p = α + β
∑n
i=1 xi. Similar to the
analysis of the demand function competition, we find the equilibrium action of agent




(E[θi − p|si]), (1.14)
Together with market clearing, the above equation leads to the following characteri-
zation of equilibrium:
Proposition 1.11. Under a Cournot competition, there exist an equilibrium xi =




























by choosing quantities (x1, ..., xn), while subject to the same informational constraints
as the agents. By taking the first-order condition of maximizing the expected total
surplus, we have the following proposition:
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From Propositions 1.11 and 1.12 it is immediate that the economy is efficient when
traders compete á la Cournot. This is in contrast to our results in Section 1.5, where
we showed that an economy in which traders compete in schedules is efficient if and
only if traders have identical trading costs (which results in a fully revealing price),
or when there is no incentive for the traders to learn from the price, i.e., their private
information is complete, or their valuations are independent. Thus, it is implied that
the inefficiency we identified in Section 1.5 is a consequence of an inefficient price
discovery process, resulting from the market characteristics.
1.9 Conclusions
This chapter investigates how heterogeneity of market participants can shape the
information content of the price, in the presence of information leakage. We find that
price informativeness is highly sensitive to the characteristics of market participants.
In particular, we find that the price is less informative the more heterogeneous the
agents are. This is a consequence of the fact that agents’ characteristics determine
the intensity of their market activity and hence the extent to which their private
information will be leaked via prices.
Moreover, we find that the market’s informational inefficiency translates into an
informational externality, resulting in an allocative inefficient market, as agents do
not internalize how their actions shape the information that is leaked via prices and
hence the information available to other agents. Two factors shape the extent of this
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externality: (i) how private signals covary with others’ estimation error of the asset’s
payoff; and (ii) the slope of agents’ demand curves. These two factors, in turn, depend
on agents’ trading costs and on the dominant role played by the price, respectively.
The sign of the covariance between agent i’s private signal and the estimation error
of other agents determines whether other agents are overestimating or underestimat-
ing the true underlying value of the good. Then, the slope of their demand curves
determine how they react to a change in the price resulting from agent i’s action.
Taken together, we find that when the informational role of price dominates, agents
submit upward-sloping demand curves, in which case, agents with high trading costs
(compared to other agents with similar private information precision) help others by
placing a higher weight on their private signal. Thus, implying, that in equilibrium
they are under-reacting to their private information. Agents with low trading costs,
on the other hand (again, compared to other agents with similar private information
precision), help others by placing less weight on their private signal. Thus, imply-
ing that in equilibrium they are over-reacting to their private information. However,
when the allocative role of price dominates, agents submit downward-sloping demand
curves, and the opposite is true – agents with high trading costs are over-reacting to
their private information, whereas agents with low trading costs are under-reacting.
We further conclude that the extent of information leakage and its effect on mar-
ket performance is tightly related to the market architecture. As opposed to con-
ventional belief, we find that welfare in a centralized market — where, potentially,
there are more gains from trade and more information to be aggregated — may be
low compared to a segmented market (i.e., agents are allowed to trade only within
one segment of the market). This result emphasizes the potential impact that the
heterogeneity-induced informational externality may have on market welfare.
Our findings suggest that the extent of information leakage via prices may vary
with the intricate details of the market structure, and the extent of information leak-
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age can have a first-order effect on the efficient operations of the market. Thus,
accounting for the possibility and extent of information leakage should be a cen-




Market Power and Strategic Interaction
2.1 Motivation and Overview of Results
In a perfectly competitive market, prices equal the social marginal cost and they are
a signal for efficient allocation of society’s resources. But perfectly competitive, and
thus efficient, markets rarely exist. Most markets are marred by “market failures”.
When there are market failures, prices no longer reflect the social marginal cost and
the resulting allocation of resources in the economy may no longer be efficient. In
such circumstances, regulatory intervention may be needed.
Market power and asymmetric information are two main sources of market failures
that may distort the efficiency of prices. Market power arises when sellers (or buyers)
have power to increase the market price above (or below) competitive levels. Infor-
mation asymmetry exists when buyers or sellers in a market have an informational
advantage that they can exploit to their benefit. Importantly, these two frictions
may also interact with one another, as informational asymmetries exacerbate mar-
ket power issues, even in large markets (e.g., see [14]). These sources of friction
have received significant attention in the literature, as well as by governments and
regulators1.
In addition to the previous two frictions, there may also be externalities and
strategic spillovers that are not mediated through markets. Firms often compete
in more than one market, e.g., financial firms investing in a diversified portfolio, or
1The financial crisis in 2008 has created new demand for understanding the effects of imperfect
competition in financial markets.
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electric companies competing in different geographical regions. Then, a change in
firm i’s action in one market may affect the actions taken by it’s competitors in other
markets they compete in, which in turn affects firm i’s profits in the first market.
The change in profit is the result of the strategic interaction between the firms, and
it depends on whether competition is with strategic complements or with strategic
substitutes2. However, theoretical work in this area lacks the analysis of markets
that take into account the presence of a “strategic effect”, while incorporating price
impact and information asymmetry.
The focus of this work is precisely to understand the interplay between the payoff
environment and the information structure in the determination of the equilibrium
outcome. Specifically, we investigate how the presence and nature of strategic interac-
tion — whether it is strategic complementarity or strategic substitutability — affects
the equilibrium actions of market participants and as a result, their price impact, in
the presence of information asymmetry. Our aims are to characterize the equilibrium
and to perform comparative statics.
To that end, we analyze a demand function competition model where agents have
incomplete information about the value of the good that is being traded. More
specifically, following [14], we focus on a non-competitive market consisting of finitely
many agents who trade a single divisible asset. Agents have interdependent valua-
tions for the asset, but are uncertain about the underlying state that determines the
asset’s payoff. Each agent observes a private signal about the asset’s fundamental
value. In addition, the price serves as an endogenous public signal with the ability
to (fully or partially) convey each agent’s private information to other market par-
ticipants. We use a reduced-form approach that allows us to represent both strategic
substitutability and strategic complementarity, in order to account for the possible
strategic effect, resulting from agents activities outside of the market (e.g., spill-overs
2This is referred to as a “strategic effect” in [19].
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and externalities). When there is no strategic effect, our model reduces to the one in
[14].
We now provide an overview of our main results. Our first set of results establishes
the existence of an equilibrium, and a closed-form characterization of the market
Bayes-Nash equilibrium. For interpretability reasons, we look at the large market
equilibrium characterization, where the number of market participants goes to infinity.
Although price impact monotonically decreases to zero as the size of the market
increases, this limit allows us to analyze the market and perform comparative statics
analyses. We find that the existence of strategic interactions between agents has a
direct impact on the weight agents put on their private information. Specifically,
agents place less weight on their private information as the intensity of strategic
interactions between them becomes stronger. From the view point of agent i, when
the actions of all other agents j 6= i have a dominant impact on her profit, she is less
incentivized to pay attention to her private information. Thus, there is a coordination
(miss-coordination) motive that offsets the desire to match the fundamentals.
Our second set of results establishes the relationship between price impact, in-
formation asymmetry and strategic interactions. We find that there is a monotonic
relation between price impact and information asymmetry: as the extent of infor-
mation asymmetry decreases, price impact decreases. Specifically, as agents’ private
information becomes biased towards the average valuation of the good, the level of
information asymmetry in the market decreases, which results in a decrease in agents’
price impact. We also characterize the relation between price impact and strategic
interaction. Importantly, this relation depends on the the slope of agents’ demand
curves. When agents submit downward-sloping demand curves, price impact de-
creases with the extent of strategic susbstitutability and increases with the extent of
strategic complementarity. However, when agents submit upwords-sloping demand
curves, price impact decreases with the extent of strategic complementarity. This is
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a consequence of the fact that the strategic effect, when agents’ actions are strategic
complements, offsets the “price effect”, which induces agents to decrease their de-
mand as price increases. However, when agents’ actions are strategic substitutes, the
strategic effect reinforces the “price effect”.
With the above results in hand, we then leverage the relations identified above to
study the trade-offs of the effects of strategic interaction and information asymmetry
on agents’ price impact. We find that when strategic interaction is strong enough,
it is able to mitigate the effect of information asymmetry on price impact, and price
impact approaches zero. However, in other cases, strategic interaction may exacerbate
the effect of information asymmetry on price impact. Importantly, this depends on
the elasticity of the supply of the good.
Overall, our theoretical findings provide insight on the role of strategic interaction
in shaping market outcomes, and the impact it has on agents’ price impact with
different levels of uncertainty. They also suggest that it is important for policy makers
to take strategic interaction into account when discussing possible price impact of
market participants.
2.2 Literature Review
Our theoretical framework is related to the literature on rational expectations equi-
librium (REE) with a Gaussian information structure, such as [33], [29], [3], [25] and
[46], among many others3. Within this literature, our work is most closely related to
[14] who study market power and price volatility in demand function competitions
with a general incomplete information structure. They show that any degree of mar-
ket power can arise in the unique equilibrium under an information structure that is
arbitrarily close to complete information. In particular, market power may be arbi-
3For an extensive review of the early models see [65], chapters 3-4, and for a more recent literature
review see [59].
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trarily close to zero or arbitrarily large. The payoff function in our model generalizes
the one used in [14], by accounting for the possibility of additional strategic interac-
tion between agents, originating from outside the market. In contrast to their results,
our findings show that when there is a high enough interaction between agents, price
impact approaches zero for any level of information asymmetry.
The informational role of prices has received significant attention in the REE
literature with asymmetric information (see, among others, [29], and [28]). REE
have been implemented with auctions ([50], [56]) or with competition in schedules
([46], and [66]). [57] extend the model in [66] to asymmetrically correlated valuations
and show that the equilibrium may fail to be privately revealing. In contrast to these
papers, the price in our framework is always fully privately revealing. Nonetheless,
the incompleteness of information has non-trivial implications for market power.
Competition in supply or demand schedules has a long tradition in the literature.
It was studied in the absence of uncertainty by [28] and [31], who showed a great
multiplicity of equilibria. Similar results in a complete information setting were ob-
tained by [68] in a share auction model. [43] showed how adding uncertainty in the
supply function model can reduce the range of equilibria and even pin down a unique
equilibrium provided the uncertainty has unbounded support. [46] introduced private
information into a double auction for a risky asset of unknown liquidation value and
derived a unique symmetric linear Bayesian equilibrium in demand schedules. [66]
studied a model of strategic competition in schedules with an information structure
that encompasses private and common values, avoiding the need for introducing noise
traders or noisy supply. While we define a similar model to [66], non of these paper
consider the strategic effect between agents and it’s impact on the equilibrium actions
as well as on the price impact.
Also related is the literature on the use of information in quadratic-payoff games,
e.g., [52], [9], [63]. This literature studies the efficient use of public versus private
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information. [52] show that in a game with strategic complementarities, agents might
over-react to public information, and so releasing more public information can reduce
social welfare. [9] generalize the model in [52] and study the efficient use of public
information for different economies. As opposed to our model, they consider exoge-
nous public information, and so the weight agents put on their private information
does not affect the content of the public signal. [63] provide a necessary and suffi-
cient condition for welfare to increase with public or private information for given
precision of information. While these papers consider an exogenous public signal, our
work considers an endogenous public signal (the price). Also, we are interested in
comparative statistics of the equilibrium outcome, as opposed to a welfare analysis
that is done in these papers.
Information frictions have been incorporated in market competition models start-
ing from the pioneering work of [48] in macroeconomics, [29] and [45] in finance, [68]
and [50] in auctions, [66] in models of competition in schedules, and many others4. In
a lab study, [12] examine both information frictions and market power: the authors
study whether cost interdependence leads to greater market power in relation to when
costs are uncorrelated. In contrast to these papers we look at the interaction between
information asymmetry and price impact, in the presence of strategic effects.
Price impact has been studied in different economic settings. In financial mar-
kets, [34], [22], [23], [41] and [42] show the significance of institutional investors’ price
impact. [60] initiated the estimation of the slope of aggregate market demand, show-
ing that the demand curve for US equities is downward sloping and thus there is
a price impact when large orders are executed. In [66], price impact (as measured
by the slope of a trader’s residual supply, otherwise known as “Kyle’s lambda” in
market microstructure models) is monotone in the number of bidders, and as the
number of bidders grows large, the allocation converges to a Walrasian equilibrium
4For an extensive literature review see [54].
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with price-taking behavior. [58] show that with heterogeneous correlation in valu-
ations, the result in [66] need not hold. [14] show that when considering a general
information structure, price impact may take any value from zero to infinity (as well
as negative values). In contrast, our work offers a theoretical analysis which takes
into account agents’ price impact, but also considers strategic interactions between
agents, and we are interested in characterizing the relation between price impact,
strategic interaction and information asymmetry.
Strategic interactions have been studied in different settings. In a complete in-
formation network setting in [2], where firms interact through input-output linkages
under complete information, and it is the heterogeneous interactions between firms
that cause aggregate volatility to not vanish. In particular, the shocks of some firms
have disproportionate high impact on aggregate volatility due to the interaction ma-
trix. The equilibrium behavior in arbitrary networks and in arbitrary information
structures are tightly linked, as argued by [51]. Most related to our work is [13], who
study the equilibrium outcome when agents have asymmetric information and there
is heterogeneous interaction between agents. In contrast, we consider homogeneous
interaction between agents, and we are interested in the impact it has on agents’ price
impact in a setting with asymmetric information.
2.3 Model
Consider an economy consisting of n agents, denoted by {1, 2, . . . , n}, who trade a
divisible asset. These agents may correspond to investors in a financial market. The
supply of the good is given by an exogenous supply function S(p), represented by
a linear inverse supply function p = α + β
∑
i xi, where α and β are non-negative
constants and
∑
i xi is the total demand. Agents choose the quantity the quantity of
the good xi to acquire.. The realized payoff of agent i, who obtains xi units of the
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asset, is given by







where θi is i’s valuation of the good, p denotes the price of the good, and γ ∈ R
is a parameter that captures strategic interactions between agents. When γ > 0,
agents’ actions are strategic complements, and when γ < 0, it implies that agents’
actions are strategic substitutes. Such strategic interaction can arise due to a verity
of reasons, such as competition in other markets or spillover effects. A negative γ
may also be a result of a congestion cost. While central to the analysis, we find it
more convenient to model these interactions in a reduced-form matter. Notice that in
the special case that γ = 0, our framework reduces to that of [14]. The payoff shocks
θi are symmetrically and normally distributed across the agents, with a correlation
coefficient ρ. That is, θi ∼ N(µ, σ2), and corr(θi, θj) = ρ for all pairs of agents
i 6= j, where ρ ∈ [0, 1). Thus, our model includes the special cases of common values
(ρ→ 1) and independent values (ρ = 0).
In the context of financial markets, θi represents the dividend of the traded asset,
xi is the quantity of the asset purchased by trader i, and the extra cost (benefit)
γ can arise due to competition in other markets, with firms’ actions being strategic
substitutes (complements). In the context of electricity generators, θi represents the
uncertain cost of generating electricity, xi is the quantity generated by firm i, and the
extra cost (benefit) γ can arise due to competition in other regional markets, with
firms’ actions being strategic substitutes (complements).
2.3.1 Information Structure
Prior to trading, each agent i observes a one-dimensional signal that is a deterministic
function of both her idiosyncratic shock and the aggregate shock. More specifically,





i=1 θi. That is, private signals are a compound of an agent’s own valuation
and other agents’ valuations. While there is no noise in agents’ signals, they are
nonetheless imperfect because they leave the agent uncertain about the size of the
idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks. The shocks are confounded in the agent’s signal.
Under our normality assumption on agents’ private valuations, we have that si is
also normally distributed with mean δµ and variance σ
2
n
(n+ (δ2 − 1)(1 + (n− 1)ρ)).
Notice that under this information structure, all signals (s1, ..., sn) are informative
about agent i’s valuation θi.
2.3.2 Demand Function Competition
Agents compete in demand functions, according to which all agents simultaneously
submit demand schedules that specify their demand for the asset as a function of the
price p. Each agent i submits a demand function xi(si, p) specifying the demanded
quantity as a function of her private signal si and the market price p. The price is
then determined by the submitted demand schedules for given realizations of signals
si, i = 1, ..., n, and the market-clearing condition:




The assumption that agents submit price-contingent demand schedules enables
them to take the information content of the price into account. In other words, the
price can serve as an endogenous public signal with the ability to (fully or partially)
convey agents’ private information to one another.
2.4 Equilibrium
We study the Bayes-Nash equilibrium of the demand function competition. The
equilibrium is defined as a collection of demand schedules xi(si, p), where (i) each
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agent i ∈ 1, ..., n maximizes her expected payoff conditional on her information set
{si, p}, and (ii) the market clears.
Formally, every agent i chooses xi(si, p) to maximize her expected profit, condi-
tional on her information set {si, p}, given by:







such that the market clears, or in other words, p satisfies equation (2.2).
As is standard in the literature, we restrict our analysis to equilibria in linear
strategies of the form xi = aisi + bi − cip for constants (ai, bi, ci). That is, agent i’s
demand schedule xi is an affine function of her private signal si and the market price
p. Since agents are symmetric, we are interested in symmetric linear equilibria of the
form xi = asi + b− cp. Then, the market clearing-condition implies
p =





Given linear strategies of all other agents xj(sj, p) = asj + b− cp, j 6= i, agent i faces
a residual inverse supply: S(p)−
∑
j 6=i xj(sj, p). This implies:




= α + βxi + βa
∑
j 6=i
sj + βb(n− 1)− βc(n− 1)p
Rearranging the above expression, we get that the residual inverse supply is a linear
combination of
∑
j 6=i sj and xi.




The price impact determines the rate at which the price changes as the quantity
bought by agent i changes5. Thus, it determines how much demand agent i withholds
5This is known as Kyle’s Lambda.
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to decrease/increase the equilibrium price of the good. Since agents are symmetric,
we have λi = λ ∀i, in equilibrium. Notice that the slope of the residual inverse supply







1 + βc(n− 1)
(2.5)
Another consequence of equation (2.4) is that the information provided by the price
to agent i about the signals of others is subsumed in the intercept of i’s residual




Throughout our analysis, we assume that α = 0, for simplicity.
We have the following result:
Proposition 2.1. There exists a symmetric equilibrium in linear strategies of the
form xi = asi − cp with
a =
1
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The above result, which will serve as the basis for the rest of our analysis, provides
an explicit characterization of agents’ equilibrium strategies and market-clearing price
as a function of the model primitives, β, δ and γ, where recall that δ parameterizes
the informativeness of each agent’s signal about her valuation, whereas γ measures
the extent and nature of strategic interaction between agents.
Equations (2.6) and (2.7), which characterize the weight agents put on their pri-
vate information and on the price, respectively, depend on the endogenous parameter
λ, which is characterized in equation (2.8). Despite the complex dependence of λ
on model primitives, there are still a few observations one can make from Proposi-
tion 2.1. First, from Equation (2.6), we see that when agents are price takers, i.e.,
λ = 0, then γ is the only model primitive that affects the weight agents put on their
private information. Specifically, as strategic interaction between agents increases,
agents become less sensitive to their own private signal. This is true for both types
of strategic interaction (i.e., strategic substitutability and strategic complementar-
ity). As the interaction between agents increases, it has a higher impact on agent i’s
payoff, and agent i puts less weight on her private information. This is somewhat
similar to agents behavior in Keynes’s beauty contest example. In our model, a large
population of agents have access to public and private information on the underlying
fundamentals, and aim to take actions appropriate to the underlying state. But they
also engage in a competition where agent i’s payoff depends on the actions of the other
agents. Depending on whether agents’ actions are strategic complements or strategic
substitutes, their payoff may increase or decrease, respectively, as their actions are
more aligned with the other agents. In other words, there is a coordination (or misco-
ordination) motive to the agents as well as the desire to match the fundamentals. As
|γ| increases, the coordination (or miscoordination) motive becomes more dominant
than the motive to align the true state fundamentals 6.
6This result is different than in [52], who conclude that when actions are strategic substitutes,
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Second, from Equation (2.7), we find that as price impact increases (while keeping
β constant), the weight agents put on the price decreases. This may imply that agents
prefer to decrease the level of dependence their actions’ have on the price, when the
market experiences high levels of price impact. This holds for both cases, when
price impact is positive or negative. We further discuss this in Section 2.5, where we
analyzes a large market approximation model.
2.4.1 Information Revelation
An important concept in the REE literature is information revelation by prices. In-
formation related to the valuation of a good that is being traded is often dispersed
throughout the market. The market price aggregates the information held by differ-
ent market participants and may transmit it back, fully or partially, to the agents
participating in the market. Following [4], we have the following definition:
Definition 2.1. The equilibrium is fully privately revealing to agent i if E[θi|si, p] =
E[θi|s1, ..., sn].
In other words, under full private revelation, the price coupled with agent i’s
private signal serve as a sufficient statistic for all the information dispersed throughout
the market. We say the market is informationally efficient if the equilibrium is fully
privately revealing to all agents simultaneously.
From Proposition 2.1, we observe that in our model the equilibrium is fully pri-
vately revealing to all agents i ∈ {1, ..., n}. Formally,
Lemma 2.1. In equilibrium, the market is informationally efficient.
This means that in equilibrium, every agent i ∈ {1, ..., n} is able to learn from
the price p, together with her own private information si, all the information held
agents put more weight on their private information than on the public. But, they refer to exogenous
public information, whereas we have endogenous public information (the price of the good).
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by the other agents j 6= i, that is relevant to her private valuation θi. This is the
case regardless of the value of δ and hence how agents’ private signals weigh the
idiosyncratic and the common components.
To see why this is true, notice from equation (2.9), that the equilibrium price p is
an affine function of the average valuation of all agents, θ̄. As a result, by observing
the price p, agent i can infer the value of θ̄. Obviously, this information is also
available to agent i when she knows all other agents private information. Given our
noise-free information structure, combining the knowledge of θ̄ with her private signal
si, agent i can infer her exact valuation of the good, θi.
Notice, that under the noise-free information structure, private revelation to agent
i is equivalent to full information of agent i’s private valuation. This means that in
equilibrium, all agents have full information of their own private valuations. However,
agent i does not know the value of the other agents’ private valuations, as opposed
to a complete information economy.
2.5 Large Markets
The equilibrium characterization in Proposition 2.1 is difficult to interpret, and thus
we turn to studying the equilibrium in its continuum limit. Although price impact
monotonically decreases as the number of agents participating in the market increases
(in fact, the price impact basically disappears as n goes to infinity), taking the limit
of n→∞ will allow us to simplify the equilibrium characterization. As a result, we
will be able to better understand and analyze this market, which is the goal of this
work.
In this section we therefore continue our analysis for large markets, where n→∞7.
7One needs to be careful in defining the information agents hold in a large market limit, when
there is a possibility to learn from prices other agents’ information. However, in our setting, agents
already have full information of their private valuations in equilibrium in the finite market setting,
and thus there is no change in the information agents have when looking at the limit with infinitely
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An immediate result from Proposition 2.1 is an equilibrium characterization for the
large market model:



















There are five immediate observations from Corollary 2.1. First, from equation
(2.11), we see that the weight agents put on their private signal does not depend on δ.
However, from equation (2.12), the weight agents put on the price p does depend on
δ. By changing the private signal’s weight on the agent’s own payoff shock θi relative
to the other agents’ payoff shocks, we change the weight an agent puts on the price
in equilibrium. This is made clear from looking at the equation for agent i’s expected
valuation of the good conditional on her private signal and on the price:







The parameter δ determines the weight an agent places on all agents’ signals to-
gether, which, in turn, is a sufficient statistic for the price. As a result, δ affects the
perceived (agents’ conditional expectation) degree of the interdependence between
agents’ valuations of the good.
Second, from equation (2.11), we see that as strategic interaction between agents
increases, agents become less sensitive to their private signal. This holds for both
types of strategic interaction, i.e., strategic substitutability and strategic comple-
mentarity. Thus, even in the large market, there exist these two forces that work in
opposite direction in shaping the weight agents’ place on their private signal: a co-
ordination (or miscoordination) motive and a desire to match the fundamentals. As
many agents.
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|γ| increases, the coordination (or miscoordination) motive becomes more dominant
than the motive to align the true state fundamentals.
Third, the weight agents put on the price, which is the slope of the demand
schedule, has the same sign as the price impact. That is, when the slope of agent i’s
demand schedule is positive, then her price impact is positive, and when the slope
of her demand schedule is negative, then her price impact is negative. To see the
intuition underlying this result, consider a case where agent i has a downward-sloping
demand curve and a negative price impact. In this case, the more agent i buys, the
more the price decreases, and then the more she continues to buy. That means, agent
i can potentially buy infinitely many units in a price close to zero. This, of course, is
not realistic. Similarly, if agent i has an upward-sloping demand curve and a positive
price impact, then she would potentially buy more and more, increasing the price to
infinity. But, this scenario is also not realistic.
Fourth, equation (2.10) implies that the effect of strategic interaction on price
impact is ambiguous. It is not enough to know the type of interaction between
agents, i.e., strategic complements or strategic substitutes, in order to determine the
sign of agents’ price impact and the way it changes with the intensity of interaction.
However, in Propositions 2.2 and 2.3 we show that by fixing some of the model
parameters, we can determine a relation between γ and price impact.
Finally, we can characterize agents’ demand behavior in terms of the model pa-
rameters. In other words, we can determine when is agent i’s demand schedule
downward-sloping and when is it upward-sloping, as a function of the model primi-
tives. We formulate this observation in the following corollary:
Corollary 2.2. When δ > 08 we have:
8This corollary can be characterized for δ < 0 as well (in fact, the proof includes this character-
ization). The difference in these two cases is in the way agents interpret a change in the price. This
is a consequence of the fact that when δ > 0, good news for agent i means bad news for agent j,
whereas when δ < 0, good news for agent i means bad news for agent j. This results in a opposite
characterization of agents’ demand schedules.
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(i) if γ < β, the equilibrium demand schedule is downward-sloping.
(ii) if γ > β, the equilibrium demand schedule is upward-sloping.
The corollary above tells us under which conditions on the model parameters: δ, γ
and β, agents’ demand schedules are upward-sloping in equilibrium, and under which
conditions they are downward-sloping in equilibrium. In particular, the parameter
γ can be divided into two regions, determined by β, where in one region agents’
demand schedules are upward-sloping, and in the other, agents’ demand schedules
are downward-sloping.
To understand why agents increase or decrease their demand as a result from a
change in the price, it is helpful to examine agent i’s payoff function. Recall that agent
i’s payoff function, given by equation (2.3), has four components: (1) the valuation
of the good; (2) the price; (3) a fixed cost; and (4) a strategic interaction term.
Agent i computes the conditional expectation of her valuation, given her private
information and the information inferred from the price. In Section 2.4.1 we proved
that in our model, agents are able to compute their true value. Importantly, the
true valuation of the good is not affected by the price or by other agents’ actions.
The second component, however, is effected by the price explicitly, but also by other
agents’ actions, implicitly, as by definition p = α + β
∑
i xi. In general, as the price
increases, agent i’s payoff decreases. Thus, keeping everything else equal, an increase
in the price decreases agent i’s demand. The third component is fixed and thus is
not affected by any other factors. Finally, the forth component is determined by the
value of γ and by the actions of the other agents. We conclude that the two terms
which are relevant in determining agent i’s reaction to a change in the price, are
the second and forth components, which we will refer to as the price effect and the
strategic effect, respectively.
When agents’ actions are strategic substitutes (i.e., γ < 0 < β), their actions
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offset one another: agent i decreases her demand as other agents increase theirs.
This results in downward-sloping demand curves: when other agents increase their
demand, they induce a price increase. The strategic effect (agents’ actions being
strategic substitutes) from other agents’ increased demand results in a decrease in
agent i’s demand, and it is in fact reinforced be the price effect, which also induces
agent i to decrease her demand in response to the increase in price.
When agents’ actions are strategic complements (i.e., γ > 0), their actions rein-
force one another: agent i increases her demand as other agents increase their demand.
In this case we have two forces working in opposite direction: as before, when other
agents increase their demand, they cause an increase in the price, which, in turn
reduces agent i’s demand (this is the price effect). But, in the case with strategic
complements, the strategic effect induces an increase in agent i’s demand. Thus, the
direction of agents’ demand curves depends on which force dominates: if the strategic
effect is stronger, then agents will submit upward-sloping demand curves. However, if
the price effect is stronger, then agents will submit downward-sloping demand curves.
Which force is stronger then depends on the parameter β. Indeed, when β is relatively
small, an increase (decrease) in agents’ demand results in only a small increase (de-
crease) in the price. This implies that the price effect is small, whereas the strategic
effect remains the same (it is independent of β). Therefore, when β is small relative
to γ, the strategic effect dominates the price effect, which in turn results in agents
having upward-sloping demand curves. On the other hand, when β is relatively large
with respect to γ, then the price effect dominates the strategic effect, and agents have
downward-sloping demand curves9.
Determining the direction of agents’ demand schedules is crucial, as we will see
in the next following sections. Now, with the equilibrium characterization for the
9This is somewhat similar to our results in Chapter 1, regarding the relation between β and the
slope of the demand curve.
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large market in hand, we are ready to analyze agents’ price impact. We will show
that the way agent i’s price impact interacts with the level of information asymmetry
between agents, and with the intensity of agents’ strategic interaction, highly depends
on whether agents submit upward- or downward-sloping demand schedules.
2.5.1 Price Impact and Information Asymmetry
In this section we explore the interaction between price impact and information asym-
metry. In their paper, [14], the authors study what are possible range of market power
in an environment with asymmetric information between agents. Their main result
is that, in general, there is no robust prediction of the expected market power for all
possible information structures. In our model, we allow for a strategic effect between
agents, and we are interested to see how this affects the possible interaction between
price impact and information asymmetry. The following proposition characterizes
the relationship between price impact and the level of information asymmetry, while
allowing for strategic complementarity or strategic substitutability. We first state the
following Lemma, which will be helpful in understanding the proposition following it.
Lemma 2.2. For fixed values of β and γ,
(i) if γ < β, then λ decreases with δ;
(ii) if γ > β, then λ increases with δ.
The Lemma above implies that for any pair of fixed values of β and γ, the pa-
rameter λ changes monotonically with δ. Whether it monotonically increases or
monotonically decreases depends on the relation between β and γ.
The characterization in Lemma 2.2 is the consequence of Corollaries 2.1 and 2.2.
Corollary 2.1 characterizes λ as a function of the model primitives: β, γ and δ. Also,
it implies that the price impact is positive whenever agents have downward-sloping
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demand curves, and it is negative whenever agents have upward-sloping demand
curves. Corollary 2.2 determines if agents have upward- or downward-sloping demand
curves, as a function of the model primitives: β, γ and δ. Taken together, one can
derive the relation in Lemma 2.2 (the proof requires showing the the parameter λ is
uniformly continuous as a function of the parameter δ).
Notice, that when price impact is negative, an increase in the value of λ is in
fact a decrease in the value of |λ|. Thus, an immediate result from Lemma 2.2
is the following proposition characterizing the relation between price impact and
information asymmetry.
Proposition 2.2. For fixed values of β and γ, price impact decreases with |δ|.
Proposition 2.2 implies that agent i’s price impact decreases as the private sig-
nals place a higher weight on the average valuation. To understand the underlying
intuition of Proposition 2.2, notice that when |δ| is large, even though agents are in-
completely informed, there is only a small level of information asymmetry. That is, all
agents know the common component, but they do not know their private valuation.
This means that no agent has an informational advantage on any other agent, imply-
ing also that agent i’s private information is not very valuable to the other agents. On
the other hand, when |δ| is small, agents’ private signal depends more heavily on the
idiosyncratic component, implying a high level of information asymmetry between
agents. In general, as the level of asymmetry between agents decreases we expect the
price impact to decrease. Indeed, that is the underlying implication of Proposition
2.2.
This relation is illustrated in Figures 2.1 and 2.2. In Figure 2.1, we can see how
agent i’s price impact changes with δ, for fixed values of β and γ, where γ < β
(particularly, γ = 0, that is, there is no additional strategic interaction between
agents). We see that the price impact decrease with δ in this case. Furthermore, we
notice that when δ < 0, then the price impact is negative, and when δ > 0, then the
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Figure 2.1: Equilibrium price impact in
a market with no strategic interaction
(γ = 0 < β = 10).
Figure 2.2: Equilibrium price impact in
a market when γ > β (γ = 15, β = 10).
price impact is positive. Thus, we can conclude that when agent i’s price impact is
negative, it approaches zero as δ decreases to −∞, and when agent i’s price impact
is positive, it approaches zero as δ increases to ∞. Similarly, in Figure 2.2, we can
see how price impact changes with δ in the case when γ > β (particularly,γ = 15
and β = 10). In this case, the shape of agent i’s price impact flips, and it increases
with δ. Now, price impact is positive when δ < 0 and negative when δ > 0. Thus
resulting in a increase as δ increases to ∞, and a decreases as δ decreases to −∞.
Put together, we see that the magnitude of agent i’s price impact decreases with |δ|,
as expected.
We continue by studying the effect of having strategic interaction between agents.
2.5.2 Price Impact and Strategic Interaction
In the previous section we proved that as the extent of information asymmetry de-
creases, price impact decreases. In this section we further explore the interaction
between price impact and strategic interaction. First, we study the effect of strategic
interaction between agents on agent i’s price impact, regardless of the existence or
level of information asymmetry. We have the following proposition which character-
izes the relationship between agent i’s price impact and the parameter γ.
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Proposition 2.3. For any fixed value of δ > 0,
(i) when demand schedules are downward-sloping, price impact increases with γ.
(ii) when demand schedules are upward-sloping, price impact decreases with γ.
The proposition above implies that when demand is downward-sloping, strategic
complementarity increases agents’ price impact, whereas strategic substitutability
decreases it. When agents’ demand schedules are upward-sloping, strategic comple-
mentarity decreases agents’ price impact.
This brings us back to the importance of Corollary 2.2, which identifies the condi-
tions on the model primitives under which agents have downwards or upwards-sloping
demand curves. Corollary 2.1 implies that the price impact is positive whenever
agents have downward-sloping demand curves, and it is negative whenever agents
have upward-sloping demand curves. Taken together, we find that when agents have
positive price impact, having strategic complementarity increases agents price im-
pact. However, this is only true while demand curves are downward-sloping. From
Proposition 2.2, we know that when strategic complemetarity is strong (with respect
to β), then agents submit upward-sloping demand curves, and then we find that price
impact decreases with the extent of the interaction.
Figure 2.3 explains the underlying intuition of Proposition 2.3. Consider the
case when agent i has positive price impact. That implies that by buying more
units of the good, agent i is able to increase the price of the good. That, in turn,
means there is a shift to the right in the demand curve (illustrated by a shift from




eq) in Figure 2.3). From Corollary 2.1, we know that
price impact is positive whenever agents’ demand is downward-sloping. So, on the
one hand, we have downward-sloping demand, which implies that a price increase
reduces demand, and in turn reduces the price. But, on the other hand, if agents










Figure 2.3: Positive price impact
the other agents to increase their demand. Thus, downward-sloping demand and
strategic complementarity have an opposite effect on the total demand curve, and
as a result on the price. The existence of strategic complementarity decreases the
effect of the downward-sloping demand, and so, as the interaction increases, the price
impact increases. A similar explanation holds when agent i has a negative price
impact, and agents submit upwards-sloping demand schedules.
Our results in Sections 2.5.1 and 2.5.2 illustrate that both information and inter-
action have a first-order effect on agents’ price impact. We saw that by keeping one
of these variables fixed, the price impact changes monotonically in the other variable,
with the direction of change depending on the sign of the slope of the demand curve.
2.5.3 Price Impact, Information and Interaction
In this section, we study the effect of strategic interaction on price impact, while
changing the level of information asymmetry. In other words, we compare an eco-
nomic environment with high levels of information asymmetry with one that has a
low level of information asymmetry, by changing the weight agents’ private signals
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place on the common component relative to the idiosyncratic component of the good’s
valuation. In particular, high values of |δ| imply a higher weight on the common com-
ponent, which in turn, implies a move towards information symmetry, whereas small
values of |δ| imply a higher weight on the idiosyncratic component, which in turn,
implies a move towards a high level of information asymmetry.
From our characterization of the price impact λ in equation 2.10 in Corollary 2.1,
we can see the monotonic relation between the price impact and the parameter δ.
Most importantly, we find that as |δ| increases, and agents’ information asymmetry
decreases, price impact decreases. We also find that there is a monotonic relation be-
tween price impact and the parameter γ, which depends on the slope of the demand
curve. Putting together our results in Section 2.5, we can analyze the trade-off be-
tween the effects of information asymmetry and strategic interaction on price impact.
We do so by comparing the change in price impact as a function of γ for different
values of delta. We also incorporate the case of agents having full information of
their private valuation by setting δ = 1 (implying that each agent i receives a private
signal si = θi).
In Figures 2.4 and 2.5 we can see how price impact changes with γ in the case
where agents have full information of their private valuations (blue curve) and in
the case where agents’ private information leans towards the common component of
the good’s valuation, i.e., high value of |δ| (red curve). As agents’ private signals
become more symmetric, their price impact decreases. However, we can see that as
the strategic interaction between agents increases (either it’s strategic complementary
or strategic substitutability), it diminishes the effect of asymmetric information on
price impact, and the price impact goes to zero, even when the level of information
asymmetry is high.
In Figures 2.6 and 2.7 we can see how price impact changes with γ in the case
when agents have full information of their private valuations (blue curve) and in the
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Figure 2.4: Equilibrium price impact with
strategic interaction γ for large values of
δ. Specifically, β = 10 and δ = 20.
Figure 2.5: Equilibrium price impact with
strategic interaction γ for large values of
δ. Specifically, β = 10 and δ = −20
Figure 2.6: Equilibrium price impact
with strategic interaction γ for small val-
ues of δ. Specifically, β = 10 and δ = 0.1
Figure 2.7: Equilibrium price impact
with strategic interaction γ for small val-
ues of δ. Specifically, β = 10 and δ =
−0.1
case when agents’ private information leans towards the idiosyncratic component of
the value of the good, i.e., small value of |δ| (red curve). When there is uncertainty
about the private valuation of the good and a high level of asymmetry, then price
impact may be very high, especially with respect to the case where agents have
full information of their private valuation. However, we can see that as strategic
interaction between agents increases (either it’s strategic complementary or strategic
substitutability), it diminishes the effect of asymmetric information on price impact,
and the price impact goes to zero.
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2.6 Conclusions
In this work, we investigate the implications of incomplete information and learning
from prices on agents’ price impact in the presence of strategic interaction (strategic
substitutability or strategic complementarity). We find that strategic interaction has
a direct impact on agents’ price impact. In particular, we find that when demand
schedules are downward-sloping, the price impact increases as the extent of strategic
complementarity increases, but when demand schedules are upward-sloping, the price
impact decreases as strategic complementarity gets stronger. This is a consequence of
the fact that when demand schedules are downward-sloping, agents have positive price
impact, which is enforced by strategic complementarity. Strategic complementarity
induces agents to buy more even if there is an increase in the price, which offsets
the reduction in demand induced by the price effect. When demand schedules are
upward-sloping, agents have negative price impact, which is weakened by strategic
complementarity.
Moreover, we find that when private information is a compound of an agent’s
own valuation and other agents valuations, the relative weight between these two
components has a monotonic effect on price impact. We find that as agents’ pri-
vate information puts more weight on the average valuation, agents’ price impact
decreases. This is a consequence of the fact that as the private information puts
lower weight on the idiosyncratic component, and higher weight on the common
component, agents’ private signals become more symmetric. A decrease in the level
of information asymmetry between agents, decreases their price impact.
Finally, we studied the trade-offs of the effects of strategic interaction and infor-
mation asymmetry on agents’ price impact. We find that strategic interaction may
mitigate or exacerbate the effect of information asymmetry on price impact, and it
depends on the slope of the inverse supply function. But, when strategic interaction
is strong enough, it is able to mitigate the effect of information asymmetry on price
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impact, and price impact approaches zero.
Our findings suggest that accounting for agents strategic interaction, whether it
is strategic complements or strategic substitutes, is crucial when analyzing agents’
price impact in markets with asymmetric information. Policies that shape the in-
teraction of agents that participate in the market may have direct effect on price
impact, and as such, on the efficient operations of the market. Thus, accounting for
the possibility of strategic substitutability and/or strategic complementarity should
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A.1 CARA Utility Function
A common utility function in the finance literature is the constant absolute risk
aversion (CARA) utility. However, the CARA utility function is not as tractable as
the quadratic - Gaussian framework when solving for the team-efficient benchmark,
which is necessary for doing a welfare analysis. While we use a quadratic utility
function in our analysis (which is also common in the literature), we show that our
main characterization of the market being informationally efficient if and only if
all trading costs λi are identical, still holds when using a CARA utility function.
This implies that the insights from Chapter 1 are robust and are not specific to the
quadratic utility framework.
Consider an economy consisting of n competitive traders, denoted by {1, 2, . . . , n},
who trade a divisible asset. Suppose instead of a quadratic utility, agents now have
a CARA utility. The realized payoff of trader i who obtains xi units of the asset is
thus given by
πi(xi) = − exp{−λi(xi(θi − p))} (A.1)







Considering linear actions of the form xi = aisi − cip, imply:
ai =
∑
j 6=i(1− ρ+ σ2j )a2j + ρ(1− ρ)(
∑
j 6=i aj)












Recall that by using a quadratic utility function, we had:
ai =
∑
j 6=i(1− ρ+ σ2j )a2j + ρ(1− ρ)(
∑
j 6=i aj)





(1 + σ2i )
∑





From equation (A.3), the weight ai agents put on their private information is given
by the solution to the following fixed point equation:
ai =
∑

















We will show that if the equilibrium is fully privately revealing, it must be the case
that all trading costs are identical (the only if part is immediate). Suppose all signals
are ex-ante symmetric, i.e. σi = σ for all i. In this case, if the equilibrium is fully
revealing it must be the case that ai = Q, where Q is some constant. Plugging that
back in equation (A.4) gives,
Q =
(1− ρ+ σ2)(n− 1)Q2 + ρ(1− ρ)(n− 1)2Q2
λiσ2 ((1− ρ+ σ2)(n− 1)Q2 + ρ(1− ρ)(n− 1)2Q2) + ρσ2(n− 1)Q





1− ρ+ σ2 + (n− 1)ρ(1− ρ)
Thus, λi must be constant for all i.
A.2 Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1.1
Recall that the (ex ante) expected profit of trader i is given by E[πi] = E[θixi] −
1
2
λiE[x2i ]− E[pxi] and suppose trader i follows a linear strategy given by xi = aisi +
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bi − cip, where ai, bi, and ci are coefficients that only depend on model parameters.
Plugging this expression into i’s expected profit implies that

















i + bi(λici − 1)E[p].
Trader i’s objective is to maximize her expected profit while taking the price as
given. As a first observation, note that i’s objective function is jointly concave in
(ai, bi, ci). Therefore, the first-order conditions with respect to these parameters are
both necessary and sufficient for optimality. Hence, the best-response strategy of
trader i satisfies the following relationships:
1− λi(1 + σ2i )ai + (λici − 1)E[psi] = 0 (A.5)
−λibi + (λici − 1)E[p] = 0 (A.6)
−E[θip]− (λici − 1)E[p2] + λiaiE[psi] + λibiE[p] = 0. (A.7)
On the other hand, market clearing requires that y +
∑n
i=1 xi = 0, where y is the




(aisi + bi − cip) = 0,
where we are using the fact that the first-order condition of the outside trader is
given by α − p + βy = 0. Rearranging the above terms therefore implies that the
equilibrium price is given by (1.6).
Equations (A.5)–(1.6) provide a system of equations that relate traders’ equilib-
rium strategies to the model fundamentals. Plugging in the expression for the price





k 6=i(1− ρ+ σ2k)a2k + ρ(1− ρ)(
∑
k 6=i ak)
2 − ρσ2i ai
∑
k 6=i ak












k 6=i ak)(α + β
∑n
k=1 bk)












k 6=i ak)(1 + β
∑n
k=1 ck)









The proof is complete once we show that the system of equations (A.8)–(A.10) has
a solution (ai, bi, ci)
n
i=1. We first establish that there exists a vector a = (a1, . . . , an)
that satisfies (A.8) for all i. To this end, define the mapping Φ : Rn++ → Rn++ as
Φi(a) =
∑



















Note that a satisfies equilibrium condition (A.8) if and only Φ(a) = a. Define the set
A =
∏n
i=1[ai, ai], where ai = λ
−1
max(1− ρ)/(1− ρ+ σ2i ) and ai = λ−1min(1− ρ)/(1− ρ+ σ2i ),
with λmax and λmin denoting the largest and smallest trading costs, respectively. It is
easy to verify that Φi(a) ≥ ai whenever ρσ2i
∑
k 6=i ak(λmax(1−ρ+σ2k)ak−(1−ρ)) ≥ 0,
which holds trivially as long as ak ≥ ak for all k 6= i. Similarly, Φi(a) ≤ ai as long
as ρσ2i
∑
k 6=i ak(λmin(1− ρ+ σ2k)ak − (1− ρ)) ≤ 0, an inequality that is satisfied when
ak ≤ ak for all k 6= i. These observations therefore imply that Φ maps the compact
and convex set A to itself. Thus, by Brouwer’s fixed point theorem, there exists a ∈ A
such that Φ(a) = a, hence guaranteeing that there exist coefficients a1, . . . , an that
satisfy equation (A.8) for all i simultaneously.
Next, consider (A.9). This system of equations has a trivial solution of bi = 0 for
all i when α = 0. We therefore consider the case that α 6= 0. Dividing both sides of




































k 6=i ak 6= −1. There-
fore, given coefficients a1, . . . , an, there exists a unique
∑n
i=1 bi that satisfies (A.11).
Plugging back this solution into (A.9) then implies that there exists a collection of
constants (b1, . . . , bn) that satisfy the equilibrium condition.





























k 6=i ak 6= −1 guarantees that the exists a unique∑n
i=1 ci that satisfies the above equation. Plugging back this solution into (A.10)
then implies that there exists a collection (c1, . . . , cn) that satisfies the equilibrium
conditions.
Proof of Proposition 1.2
Lemma A.2.1. ai(1 − ρ + σ2i ) = ak(1 − ρ + σ2k) for all pairs i and k if and only if
all trading costs coincide.
Proof. First suppose all trading costs are identical, i.e., λi = λ for all i. Under such
an assumption, it is immediate to verify that λai = (1−ρ)/(1−ρ+σ2i ), thus implying
that ai(1− ρ+ σ2i ) = ak(1− ρ+ σ2k) for all pairs of traders i and k.
To prove the converse implication, suppose ai(1− ρ+ σ2i ) = ak(1− ρ+ σ2k) for all
pairs i 6= k. This means that there exists a constant S > 0 such that (1−ρ+σ2k)ak = S
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for all k. Plugging this expression into equilibrium condition (A.8) leads to
Sλi
(






(1− ρ+ σ2i )
(






Solving for the constant S from the above expression implies that S = (1− ρ)/λi for
all i, which can hold only if λi = λk for all i and k.
We now turn to the proof of Proposition 1.2. As a first observation, note that
when n = 2, it is immediate that the equilibrium is fully privately revealing to both
traders. Hence, in the rest of the proof we assume that there are at least three
traders in the market. Suppose that the equilibrium is fully privately revealing to
all traders, where recall from Definition 1.1 that this is equivalent to assuming that
E[θi|si, p] = E[θi|s1, ..., sn] for all i, where

















































where δi is given by (A.12). Hence, full private revelation requires that the coefficient
on signal sk in the above two expressions coincide for all k. Hence, as long as there
are at least three traders in the market, full private revelation to all traders i implies
that aj/ak = (1− ρ+ σ2k)/(1− ρ+ σ2j ) for all j, k 6= i. Consequently, by Lemma
A.2.1, all trading costs have to coincide.
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Proof of Proposition 1.3
As a first observation, note that





ρ(1− ρ+ σ2i )−1 + ρ2
∑







Furthermore, recall from (1.6) that var(θi|si, p) = var(θi|si,
∑
























Finally, note that var(θi|si) = σ2i /(1 + σ2i ). Combining the above expressions implies













k 6=i(1− ρ+ σ2k)−1)−1










On the other hand, equation (A.8) implies that limρ→0 ai = wi/λi for all traders i,
where wi = 1/(1 + σ
2





















Dividing both the numerator and the denominator by
∑
k 6=iwk then complete the
proof.
Proof of Proposition 1.4
The implication that φ∗i = limn→∞ φin = 0 whenever F(λ) is degenerate is trivial. We
therefore only provide the proof of the converse implication. In particular, suppose
that φ∗i = 0. Recall from the proof of Proposition 1.3 that trader i’s information
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where G(a, λ, σ) = limn→∞Gn(na, λ, σ/
√
n) and Gn(a, λ, σ) denotes the joint empir-
ical distribution of the weight that traders assign to their private signals, their trading
costs, and the signal precisions. Note that whereas the joint distribution of λi and
σi, denoted by Fn(λ, σ) is exogenous, the weights that traders assign to their private
signals are equilibrium objects that are determined endogenously. Nonetheless, Gn
can always be expressed in terms of the model primitive Fn using equation (A.8).
1













for almost all pairs i and j. Hence, by equation (A.8), it must be the case that λi = λj,
which means that F(λ) is degenerate.
Proof of Proposition 1.5











where Qk and Mk are independent of the value of β.
Proof. Recall that equilibrium coefficients (ai, bi, ci) satisfy equations (A.8)–(A.10).
Summing both sides of (A.10) over all traders i and solving for 1 + β
∑n
i=1 ci implies
1The normalization constant n in the definition G is a consequence of the assumption that all
traders are informationally small as n → ∞. More specifically, the fact that σin grows at rate
√
n


















where δk is given by (A.12). Plugging the above back into the expression for ck in
(A.10) then establishes (A.16), where Qk and Mk are given by

















j 6=k aj. Finally, to estab-
lish that Qk and Mk are independent of β, recall that the coefficients (a1, . . . , an) are
solutions to the system of equations given by (A.8), which does not depend on β.
Hence, Qk and Mk are independent of β.
With the above lemma in hand, we now return to the proof of Proposition 1.5. We
prove this result by determining the conditions under which the equilibrium strategies
identified in Proposition 1.1 satisfy the optimality conditions of the planner’s problem.
Recall that the total ex ante surplus in the market is given by E[W ] = E[π0] +∑n
i=1 E[πi], where π0 is the surplus of the outside trader and πi is the profit of trader
i. Therefore, the market-clearing condition y +
∑n













When agents follow linear strategies in the form of xi = aisi + bi − cip, the expected
















(aisi + bi − cip)
]2
, (A.19)
where once again we are using the market-clearing condition. Thus the social planner
chooses the constants ai, bi, and ci to maximize the total expected surplus in (A.19).
We now determine the conditions under which the equilibrium strategies identified
in Proposition 1.1 satisfy the first-order conditions corresponding to the planner’s
problem.
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First, consider the planner’s first-order condition with respect to coefficients (b1, . . . , bn).
Differentiating (A.19) with respect to bi and using the fact that the market-clearing
price satisfies (1.6) implies that
dE[W ]
dbi














ck (λkbk + (1− λkck)E[p]) . (A.20)
On the other hand, recall from equation (A.6) that equilibrium coefficients satisfy
(λici−1)E[p] = λibi. Consequently, the first-order condition of the planner’s problem












But note that (1.6) implies that the right-hand side of the above expression is equal to
zero, thus implying that equilibrium strategies always satisfy the planner’s first-order
conditions with respect to bi for all parameter values.
Next, consider the social planner’s first-order condition with respect to coefficients
(c1, . . . , cn). Differentiating (A.19) with respect to ci leads to
dE[W ]
dci




























where once again we are using the fact that the market-clearing price satisfies (1.6).
On the other hand, recall that equilibrium coefficients satisfy equation (A.7). There-
fore, the first-order condition of the planner’s problem with respect to ci evaluated




















Equation (1.6) then implies that right-hand side of the above equation is equal to
zero. In other words, no matter the parameter values, the equilibrium strategies
always satisfy the planner’s first-order conditions with respect to (c1, . . . , cn).
Finally, we consider the planner’s first-order condition with respect to (a1, . . . , an).
Differentiating (A.19) with respect to ai and using the fact that the market-clearing
price satisfies (1.6) implies that
dE[W ]
dai








ck (λkakE[sisk]− E[θksi] + (1− λkck)E[sip]) . (A.22)
Recall that we have already established that dE[W ]/dbi = dE[W ]/dci = 0 at the
equilibrium strategies. Therefore, the equilibrium is constrained efficient if only if
the above expression is equal to zero when evaluated at the equilibrium strategies.
Furthermore, recall that equilibrium strategies satisfy equations (A.5)–(A.7). Hence,












ck (λkakE[sisk]− E[θksi] + (1− λkck)E[sip]) ,












ck (ρ(λkak − 1) + (1− λkck)E[sip]) .
Replacing for coefficients ai and ci from equations (A.8) and (A.10) and using the




















ai(1− ρ+ σ2i )− aj(1− ρ+ σ2j )
)
,
























We now use (A.23) to prove Proposition 1.5. As a first observation, note that when
ρ = 0, the right-hand side of the above equation is equal to zero, thus implying that
the equilibrium is constrained efficient for all profiles of trading costs. Next, consider
the case that n = 2. With only two traders, it is immediate that the right-hand
side of (A.23) is also equal to zero for all parameter values, thus once again implying
constrained efficiency. To establish that the equilibrium is constrained efficient when
all trading costs coincide, recall from Lemma A.2.1 that λi = λ guarantees that
ai(1− ρ+ σ2i ) = aj(1− ρ+ σ2j ) for all i and j. Therefore, when all trading costs are
identical, the right-hand side of (A.23) is equal to zero, thus guaranteeing constrained
efficiency.
Finally, we show that as long as n ≥ 3, trading costs are heterogeneous, and ρ > 0,
the equilibrium is constrained inefficient for almost all values of β. We establish this
by contradiction. Suppose there exist β 6= β̃ for which the equilibrium is constrained
efficient. Hence, the right-hand side of (A.23) is equal to zero for both β and β̃ and






















aj(1− ρ+ σ2j )− ai(1− ρ+ σ2i )
)
= 0,
where recall that the coefficients (a1, . . . , an) are the solution to the fixed point equa-
tion (A.8) and hence are independent of the value of β. Subtracting the above two









aj(1− ρ+ σ2j )− ai(1− ρ+ σ2i )
)
= 0 (A.24)
for all traders i. Since not all trading costs are identical, Lemma A.2.1 in the proof
of Proposition 1.2 guarantees that there exists a i such that ai(1− ρ+ σ2i ) ≤ aj(1−
ρ + σ2j ) for all j, with at least one inequality holding strictly. But since Mk > 0,
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this means that the left-hand side of (A.24) has to be strictly negative, leading to a
contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 1.6
Recall that the total ex ante surplus in the market is given by E[W ] = E[π0] +∑n
i=1 E[πi], where π0 is the surplus of the outside trader and πi is the profit of trader i.
For ease of notation, denote πi(xi) = ui(xi)−pxi and π0 = u0(y)−py. Differentiating







































Therefore, the market-clearing condition y +
∑n
i=1 xi = 0 implies that
d
dai










































− p = 0.
















∣∣∣∣ sk, p])(∂xk∂p dpdai
)]


















∣∣∣∣ sk, p])(∂xk∂p dpdai
)]∣∣∣∣ s1, . . . , sn]
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Note that all equilibrium variables have to be measurable with respect to the collection



















∣∣∣∣ s1, . . . , sn]− E [ ∂uk∂xk
∣∣∣∣ sk, p])]
Now, plugging back the marginal utility functions u′k = θk − λkxk and the linear















E [θk| s1, . . . , sn]− E [θk| sk, p]
)]
From equation (1.6) we have ∂p/∂ai = γsi, where γ = β/(1 + β
∑n
k=1 ck). On the













si,E [θk| s1, . . . , sn]− E [θk| sk, p]
)
.
Finally, using the law of iterated expectations one more time to establish that
cov (si,E [θk| s1, . . . , sn]− E [θk| sk, p]) = cov(si, θk − E [θk| sk, p]) then completes the
proof.
Proof of Proposition 1.7



















aj(1− ρ+ σ2j )− ai(1− ρ+ σ2i )
))
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if and only if
lim
ρ→0






















On the other hand, equation (A.5) implies that limρ→0 λiai = 1/(1 + σ
2
i ). Conse-


































































































Proof of Proposition 1.8
Before presenting the proof, we state and prove two simple lemmas.
Lemma A.2.3. Suppose ζ1, . . . , ζm ≥ 0 and
∑m
















for any collection of non-negative numbers y1, . . . , ym and z1, . . . , zm.
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Proof. We establish the lemma by showing that minζ f(ζ) subject to the constraint
that
∑n
k=1 ζk = 1 is equal to the right-hand side of (A.27), where f(ζ) =
∑m
k=1 yk/(ζk + zk).
First, note that f(ζ) is convex in ζ, thus implying that the first-order condition is
a sufficient for optimality. This implies that η = yk/(ζk + zk)
2, where η is the La-
grange multiplier corresponding to the constraint. Plugging this expression into the












Evaluating f(ζ) at the above values leads to the right-hand side of (A.27), thus
completing the proof.


















Proof. Recall from the proof of Proposition 1.5 that the expected welfare in the
market is given by (A.18). Furthermore, note that the first-order condition of trader
i is given by xi = (E[θi|si, p] − p)/λi, whereas that of the outside trader is given by





























































where the second equality is a consequence of the fact that E[E[θi|si, p]] = E[θi] =
0 and the law of total variance. Noting that var(θi) = 1 and E[var(θi|si, p)] =
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var(θi|si, p), which is a consequence of normality, and setting α = 0 completes the
proof.
With the above lemmas in hand, we now proceed to proving Proposition 1.8.
Proof of part (a). Suppose traders face no uncertainties about their private valu-
ations, i.e., σi = 0 for all i. This means that var(θi|si, p) = 0 for all traders regardless
of the market structure. Thus, by Lemma A.2.4, expected welfare in the centralized

















On the other hand, equations (A.8)–(A.10) imply that when σi = 0, equilibrium
strategies satisfy bi = 0 and ai = ci = λ
−1
i . Thus, by equation (1.6), the market






















































where Sk denotes the set of traders in the k-th segment and ζk is the fraction of
outside traders that are active in that segment. Applying Lemma A.2.3 to the second
term on the right-hand side above and noting that
∑
























































Equation (A.28) implies that the right-hand side of the above inequality coincides with
E[W cen], thus establishing that expected welfare is weakly higher in the centralized
market structure.
Proof of part (b). Suppose ρ = 0. This means that var(θi|si, p) = var(θi|si) =
σ2i /(1 + σ
2
i ) regardless of the market structure. Consequently, Lemma A.2.4 implies

















Equations (A.8)–(A.10) imply that when ρ = 0, the coefficients corresponding to
equilibrium strategies satisfy ai = λ
−1
i /(1 + σ
2
i ), bi = 0, and ci = λ
−1
i . Replacing for
































































Note that, by (A.29), the right-hand side of the above inequality is equal to E[W cen],
thus implying that expected welfare in the centralized architecture is higher than the
segmented architecture.
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Proof of part (c). Suppose all traders have identical trading costs, i.e., λi = λ for
all i. Since all trading costs are identical, Proposition 1.2 implies that the equilibrium
in the centralized market structure is fully privately revealing to all traders, i.e.,
var(θi|si, p) = var(θi|s1, . . . , sn) for all i. A similar argument also guarantees that
the equilibrium of the segmented market structure is also fully privately revealing to
all traders within that segment. Therefore, Lemma A.2.4 implies that the expected
welfare gain from market centralization is given by




















where S(i) denotes the set of traders that belong to the same segment as trader i
and p(i) is the market-clearing price in that segment. Since S(i) ⊆ {1, . . . , n}, it is
immediate that the first term on the right-hand side above is always non-negative.
It is therefore sufficient to establish that the second term is also non-negative. To
this end, first consider the centralized market structure. Recall that when all trading
costs are identical (A.8) implies that
ai =
1− ρ
λ(1− ρ+ σ2i )
,





(1− ρ)(1 + nβ/λ)(1 + ρ
∑n
k=1(1− ρ+ σ2k)−1)
1 + (n− 1)ρ
.
Plugging the above two expressions into the expression for the market-clearing price










β(1 + (n− 1)ρ)2
∑n
k=1(1− ρ+ σ2k)−1

















β(1 + (|S(i)| − 1)ρ)2
∑n
k=1(1− ρ+ σ2k)−1













and applying subadditivity completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 1.9









where we are using the fact that, by equation (1.6), limβ→0 p
2/β = 0. Replacing for








(1− φceni var(θi|si)− (1− φceni ) var(θi|s1, . . . , sn)) .
On the other hand, recall that var(θi|si) = σ2i /(1 + σ2i ), whereas (A.13) implies that









j 6=i(1 + σ
2
j )




































1− φsegi σ2i1 + σ2i − (1− φsegi )
 σ2i1 + σ2i − ρ
2σ4i









where φsegi is trader i’s information revelation gap in the segmented market structure.
Subtracting the above two equations from one another implies that
lim
β→0




















thus completing the proof.
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Proof of Proposition 1.10
Proof of part (i) The proof of part (i) is similar to that of Proposition 3 of
[57]. First suppose that ρij = ρ for all i 6= j. Since all trading costs coincide,
then Proposition 1.2 guarantees that the equilibrium is fully privately revealing to all
traders simultaneously.
To prove the converse implication, suppose the price is fully privately revealing to
all traders. That is, E[θi|si, p] = E[θi|s1, ..., sn] for all i. In addition, recall that when
traders follow linear strategies in the form of xi = aisi + bi − cip, the corresponding
coefficients satisfy (A.5)–(A.7). Consequently,
λai =
var(p)− E[psi]E[pθi]
(1 + σ2) var(p)− E2[psi]
,
where we are using the fact that all traders have identical trading costs and signal
precisions. Also recall that the market-clearing price satisfies (1.6). Replacing for the
price in the above expression therefore implies that coefficients (a1, . . . , an) are the



















2) + (1 + σ2)
∑










where ρ̄ is defined (1.12). Since ai = aj for all pairs of traders i and j, equation (1.6)


























(1− ρ̄+ σ2)(1 + σ2 + ρ̄(n− 1))
(





for any j 6= i. Replacing the left-hand side of the above equation with ρij and noting
that
∑
k 6=j ρjk = (n− 1)ρ̄ implies that the above equality is satisfied for all i 6= j only
if ρij = ρ̄ for all pairs of traders i 6= j.
Proof of part (ii) Recall from the proof of Proposition 1.1 that equilibrium strate-
gies satisfy equations (A.5)–(A.7). Furthermore, recall from the proof of Proposition
1.5 that the first-order conditions of the planner’s problem with respect to coefficients
ai, bi, and ci are given by (A.22), (A.20), and (A.21), respectively. As in the proof
of Proposition 1.5, it is immediate to verify that, as long as (A.6) is satisfied, the
right-hand side of (A.20) is equal to zero, thus implying that equilibrium strategies
satisfy the planner’s first-order condition with respect to bi. Similarly, using (A.7) to
simplify (A.21) implies that the right-hand side of the latter equation is also equal
to zero for all parameter values, which establishes that equilibrium strategies satisfy
the planner’s first-order condition with respect to ci.
Having established dE[W ]/dbi = dE[W ]/dci = 0 for all i, it is therefore sufficient
to verify that the right-hand side of (A.22), when evaluated at equilibrium strategies,



















where we are using the fact that all traders have identical trading costs and signal
precisions. Plugging for equilibrium actions from (A.31) and noting that equilibrium
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1 + σ2 +
∑
j 6=i ρij














The definition of ρ̄ in (1.12) now guarantees that the right-hand side of the above
equality is equal to zero, thus completing the proof.
Proof of Proposition 1.11
In equilibrium, traders maximize their expected profit, given by





i − pxi|si] (A.32)
such that the market clears, i.e., p = α + β
∑n




(E[θi − p|si]), (A.33)
From the projection theorem for Gaussian random variables, this simplifies to:
xi =
1



































This, in turn, implies
ai =
1



































































Proof of Proposition 1.12


















































































Differentiating with respect to ai and bi results in
∂E[TS]
∂ai

























Market Power and Strategic Interaction
B.1 Proofs
Proof of Proposition 2.1
Recall that the expected profit of trader i is given by,







and suppose trader i follows a linear strategy given by xi = aisi+bi−cip, where ai, bi,
and ci are coefficients that only depend on model parameters. Since we assume agents
are symmetric, we have xi = asi + b− cp for every agent i. Trader i’s objective is to
maximize her expected profit. The first order condition with respect to xi implies,
E[θi|si, p]− p− λxi − xi + γ
∑
j 6=i






and hence, the best-response strategy of trader i satisfies the following relationships:
xi =
E[θi|si, p]− p+ γ(n− 1)(b− cp) + γa
∑
j 6=i E[sj|si, p]




= λ, the second order condition with respect to xi implies that a maximum
exists if and only if:
−1− 2λ− 2γ(n− 1)cλ ≤0 (B.4)
We will find the expression of c that satisfies equation B.3 and plug in the second-order
condition above.
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(n+ (δ − 1)(1 + (n− 1)ρ)) σ2δ (1 + (n− 1)ρ)
σ2
n
(n+ (δ − 1)(1 + (n− 1)ρ)) σ2
n
(n+ (δ2 − 1)(1 + (n− 1)ρ)) δ2σ2(1 + (n− 1)ρ)











(n+ (δ2 − 1)(1 + (n− 1)ρ)) σ2
n
(nρ+ (δ2 − 1)(1 + (n− 1)ρ)) σ2δ (1 + (n− 1)ρ)
σ2
n
(nρ+ (δ2 − 1)(1 + (n− 1)ρ)) σ2
n
(n+ (δ2 − 1)(1 + (n− 1)ρ)) δ2σ2(1 + (n− 1)ρ)
σ2δ (1 + (n− 1)ρ) δ2σ2(1 + (n− 1)ρ) nδ2σ2(1 + (n− 1)ρ)

which in turn results in the following conditional expectations:























Notice that in this noise-free information structure E[θi|si, p] = θi. Thus, in equilib-
rium, every agent i is perfectly informed about her true value θi
1. Then, by comparing
the coefficients of xi = asi + b− cp and equation (B.3), we get:
a =
1
1 + λ+ γ[1 + (n− 1)λc]
(B.7)
b = 0 (B.8)














= 1− (1 + λ)(1− δ)
δβn
− γ 1 + (n− 1)δ
δβn
(B.9)











Thus, we have two equations (B.10) and (B.9) with two variables c and λ. Plugging













= 1− (1 + λ)(1− δ)
δβn
− γ 1 + (n− 1)δ
δβn
Rearranging the equation above and multiplying by λδβ(n− 1) results in
λ2
[









= −β − 2γβ









βn (1− δ(n− 1))
1 + δ(n− 1)
− 1− γ − 2γn




1 + δ(n− 1)
= 0
(B.11)
Solving this quadratic equation then completes the proof for λ.
Now, we can also substitute c in the second order condition, given by equation
(B.4), with the expression given by equation (B.10). Thus the second order conditions
are satisfied if and only if:
(i) if β > γ, then λ ≥ −β(1+2γ)
2(β−γ) ; and
99
(ii) if β < γ, then λ ≤ −β(1+2γ)
2(β−γ) .
where λ is the solution to equation B.11.
To find the equilibrium price we use equations (B.3), (B.5), and (B.6) to conclude
that
xi(si, p) =
θi − p+ γ(n− 1)(b− cp) + γa(
∑
j 6=i θj + (n− 1)(δ − 1)θ̄
1 + λ+ γ(n− 1)cλ
Substituting a and c with the expressions in equations (B.7) and (B.10) and summing

















1 + λ+ γ(1− λ/β)
(B.12)
Then, market clearing, p = β
∑




1 + γ · δ(n−1)
1+λ+γ(2−λ/β)
)
1 + λ+ βn+ γ · (β−λ)(nβ+λ)
λβ
(B.13)
Proof of Lemma 2.1
To prove that the market is informationally efficient in equilibrium, we will show that
E[θi|si, p] = E[θi|s1, ..., sn] for all i, simultaneously.
From equation (B.5), we get:






sj = θi + (δ − 1)θ̄ +
1− δ
δn
(nθ̄ + (δ − 1)nθ̄) = θi
Obviously, the information set {si, p} is contained in the information set {s1, ..., sn}.
Combining that with the equation above results in:
E[θi|s1, ..., sn] = θi
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Proof of Corollary 2.1
In order to characterize the equilibrium in the limit, we look at the limit limn→∞ λn,
where λ is given by equation (2.8):
lim
n→∞





−βn (δ(n− 1)− 1)









√n2(β (δ(n− 1)− 1)
δ(n− 1) + 1
)2
+ 2βn+ 1 + 2γ + γ2 + f(n)






















β (δ(n− 1)− 1)





γ (δ(n− 1)− 1)
δ(n− 1) + 1
)
+4γβn
n (δ(n− 1)− 1)
(δ(n− 1) + 1)2
+ v(n) + C
)1/2 (B.14)







and C = 1 + 2γ + γ2.










γ (δ(n− 1)− 1)





























Recall that the first order approximation of f(x) =
√
1 + ax+ bx2 + cx3 when x→ 0
is given by 1 + a
2










γ (δ(n− 1)− 1)










βn (δ(n− 1)− 1)
δ(n− 1) + 1
+




δ(n− 1) + 1
Plugging this back into the equation of limn→∞ λn results in
lim
n→∞
λ · n = lim
n→∞
βn






Taking the negative root of the quadratic equation for λ would result in:
lim
n→∞






−βn (δ(n− 1)− 1)











Since we know that the limit is finite for γ = 0, we conclude that only the positive
root is a valid solution.
Now we can plug equation (B.16) in equations (2.6) and (2.7) to get the expressions
for a and c, respectively, in the limit.
Proof of Corollary 2.2
In order to determine whether agents submit downward-sloping demand curves or
upward-sloping demand curves, we need to determine the sign of the parameter c,
which is the slope of agents demand curve.




slope of the demand schedule, by a closed form expression in terms of the model
primitives: δ, γ, and β. Since we assume β > 0, the parameter c is positive if and
only if δ(β − γ) is positive, implying the conditions for having a downward-sloping
demand curve (remember that agent i’s schedule is given by xi = asi−cp). Similarly,
the the parameter c is negative if and only if δ(β − γ) is negative, implying the
conditions for having an upward-sloping demand curve.
Proof of Lemma 2.2
We want to find how the price impact λ changes with the parameter δ. From Corollary





λ · n = β
δ(β − γ)
Since the equation above is for the limit as n → ∞, we cannot simply take the
derivative with respect to δ, in order to find the relation we are interested in. If we
can show that the equilibrium price impact in the finite market, given by equation
(2.8) is uniformly continuous in δ, only then we can use the derivative of the price
impact in the large market given by equation (2.10). Indeed, suppose λ(δ) is uniformly
continuous. Then, from equation (2.10), we know that the derivative of limn→∞ λ · n
with respect to δ is given by,




implying that when γ < β, then price impact is decreasing as a function of δ (the
derivative is negative), and when γ < β, then price impact is increasing as a function
of δ (the derivative is positive).





−βn (δ(n− 1)− 1)










√(βn (δ(n− 1)− 1)
δ(n− 1) + 1
)2
+ 2βn+ 1 + g(γ)















We will show that the derivative of λ(δ) with respect to δ is bounded, implying that








(γ − β)n(n− 1)






βn (δ(n− 1)− 1)
δ(n− 1) + 1
)2




4β2n2(n− 1)(δ(n− 1)− 1)

















which completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 2.2
Proposition 2.2 is an immediate consequence of Lemma 2.2 together with Corollaries
2.1 and 2.2. Indeed, from Corollary 2.1 we know that the price impact is negative
when γ > β and δ > 0 or when γ < β and δ < 0. From Lemma 2.2 we know that
when γ > β, then λ increases with δ. Thus, an increase in δ > 0 will imply a decrease
in the price impact. Similarly, when γ < β, then λ decreases with δ < 0. Thus, an
increase in δ < 0, which is equivalent to a decrease in |δ|, will imply an increase in
the price impact. A similar explanation follows when price impact is positive.
Proof of Proposition 2.3
Now, we want to find the relation between price impact and interaction. The proof
of this proposition takes the same approach as the proofs for Lemma 2.2 and Propo-
sition 2.2. In Corollary 2.1 we characterize the price impact λ in terms of the model
parameters: γ, β and δ, as given by the equation: limn→∞ nλ =
β
δ(β−γ) . Thus, we can
compute the derivative with respect to γ:





In Corollary 2.2, we identified when demand schedules are upward-sloping and when
they are downward-sloping, in terms of the model parameters: γ, β and δ. We know
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that demand schedules are upward-sloping whenever both δ > 0 and β < γ, or both
δ < 0 and β > γ. Similar to the proof of Proposition 2.2, we then need to look at
the different cases when the price impact is negative and when it is positive, and
remember that an increase in λ when λ < 0 is in fact a decrease in the price impact.
Now, it is left to prove that the derivative of λ(γ) with respect to γ is bounded,
implying that λ(γ) is a Lipschitzian function, and thus uniformly continuous. The







−βn (δ(n− 1)− 1)









βn (δ(n− 1)− 1)
δ(n− 1) + 1
)2


























+ 2βn+ 1 + g(γ)
)


























which completes the proof.
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